1 - The Decision
So this is a story I've had on my mind for a while now. I figured it was better to post something so it wasn't sitting around on my hard drive, cause at least this way it might inspire someone to write a better thing than me. Credit to Lincoln, by David Herbert Donald for giving me the idea in the first place. I recognize that it may not be the most plausible (seeing as there was a reason this never happened in real life), but I hope to make it an interesting story regardless.
When one considers the American Civil War, no decision is more momentous than the one made by President Lincoln in early 1862 to assume direct command of the Army of the Potomac. Leaving aside his pen, the lawyer would choose to become a general in a move that would drastically alter the course of American history.
Such a move was without precedent. Several Presidents had served in the military, such as Harrison, Taylor, even Washington himself. But none of those men had been active members of the military while they were President, and none had taken to the field during their tenure in office. That made the sequence of events in early 1862 all the more remarkable.
Yet it was not a decision President Lincoln made lightly. In order to understand this, we must examine the position he found himself in at the beginning of the year, and what drove a man who’d openly joked about his only military service during the Blackfoot War to such a step….
The beginning of the war had seen little in the way of Union successes. After an initial defeat at the First Battle of Manassas, the first major Union victory would only come in February of 1862, with the seizure of Forts Henry and Donelson by then Brigadier General Ulysses S Grant. But besides that, there was precious little to show that this was a fight the Union could win.
Time had been bought with the appointment of General McClellan to the Army of the Potomac. Everyone understood that time was needed to create a professional force that could defeat the South. This gave the General something of a grace period to work with and to prepare. Indeed, the Army of the Potomac had high morale, and was better prepared than it ever had been.
But while the army might be prepared, tension had soon developed between President Lincoln and General McClellan. The President was supportive of his General, but the one sided nature of their relationship made him increasingly frustrated with the man. This grew particularly troublesome as political issues deepened, and the people clamored for victory.
On the other side, General McClellan was resentful of civilian interference in the war effort. He was certain that they had bungled everything, and could not be trusted. He refused to reveal his plans to anyone in the Administration as he was confident that doing so would ensure they were leaked to the Confederacy.
McClellan was not the only one to drive the President to despair. Further west, Union commanders did not seem disposed towards the swift war Lincoln wanted. Major General Don Carlos Buell, commander of the Army of the Ohio, resisted any prodding by Washington for him to move into Eastern Tennessee in support of the Unionist elements there. He preferred to move on Nashville, despite there being little strategic value to the city. Lastly there was Major General Henry Halleck, head of the Department of the Missouri. A respected man, he was loath to bring criticism directly upon himself, perhaps jealous of Grant’s success, and resisted moving in conjunction with Buell due to the disposition of his troops. Given such a myriad of personalities resisted going on the offensive, it is not unreasonable that Lincoln chose to take up the baton of commanding an army.
The breaking point came in January. With McClellan laid up in sick bed with typhoid, Lincoln was left at wits end with how to proceed based on the military and political issues he was faced with. At the advise of Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs, the senior division commanders of the Army of the Potomac were summoned to the White House to offer advice.
In this he found conflicting messages. General McDowell suggested another move against Manassas, similar to his own attempt. Meanwhile General Franklin suggested shifting the Army down the York River, to advance against Richmond from the east. This was more in line with what McClellan sought to do, but these plans would not come to fruition.
The council assembled the next day, with McDowell and Franklin now in favor of the advance on Manassas while new arrivals Meigs and Montgomery Blair opposed the move due to the possibility of it leading to another debacle like the previous battle that took place there. Without a consensus, the meeting was adjourned a second time.
On January 13th, the last of these meetings assembled. They were joined at last by General McClellan, who regarded the meetings as a clandestine conspiracy against him. This left him sullen and uncommunicative, no doubt aggravated by his recovering state. He resisted any effort to inform the President and participating Cabinet members of what he actually intended to do, merely providing scornful and sarcastic remarks about how obvious the course of action needed to be.
Despite every plea made by those present, McClellan stood firm. He insisted that it was better for as few people to know his plans as possible. All he was willing to commit to was a pledge that he did have a plan for when and where he intended to advance, though he revealed neither.
While President Lincoln was the sort to believe the best of men, this was a step too far for him. It was compounded by the fact that, when McClellan was sick and Lincoln had sought to prompt any action at all, he learned that neither Buell nor Halleck knew of any plans McClellan had for their combined armies. For someone whose role was to manage the Union war effort, this was unacceptable.
And so, after much thinking, pondering, and mulling over the possible steps he could take, the decision was made. If Lincoln could not trust his commanders to prosecute the war, then he would have to do so himself.
The Decision
"If General McClellan does not want to use the army, I would like to borrow it for a time."
"If General McClellan does not want to use the army, I would like to borrow it for a time."
When one considers the American Civil War, no decision is more momentous than the one made by President Lincoln in early 1862 to assume direct command of the Army of the Potomac. Leaving aside his pen, the lawyer would choose to become a general in a move that would drastically alter the course of American history.
Such a move was without precedent. Several Presidents had served in the military, such as Harrison, Taylor, even Washington himself. But none of those men had been active members of the military while they were President, and none had taken to the field during their tenure in office. That made the sequence of events in early 1862 all the more remarkable.
Yet it was not a decision President Lincoln made lightly. In order to understand this, we must examine the position he found himself in at the beginning of the year, and what drove a man who’d openly joked about his only military service during the Blackfoot War to such a step….
The beginning of the war had seen little in the way of Union successes. After an initial defeat at the First Battle of Manassas, the first major Union victory would only come in February of 1862, with the seizure of Forts Henry and Donelson by then Brigadier General Ulysses S Grant. But besides that, there was precious little to show that this was a fight the Union could win.
Time had been bought with the appointment of General McClellan to the Army of the Potomac. Everyone understood that time was needed to create a professional force that could defeat the South. This gave the General something of a grace period to work with and to prepare. Indeed, the Army of the Potomac had high morale, and was better prepared than it ever had been.
But while the army might be prepared, tension had soon developed between President Lincoln and General McClellan. The President was supportive of his General, but the one sided nature of their relationship made him increasingly frustrated with the man. This grew particularly troublesome as political issues deepened, and the people clamored for victory.
On the other side, General McClellan was resentful of civilian interference in the war effort. He was certain that they had bungled everything, and could not be trusted. He refused to reveal his plans to anyone in the Administration as he was confident that doing so would ensure they were leaked to the Confederacy.
McClellan was not the only one to drive the President to despair. Further west, Union commanders did not seem disposed towards the swift war Lincoln wanted. Major General Don Carlos Buell, commander of the Army of the Ohio, resisted any prodding by Washington for him to move into Eastern Tennessee in support of the Unionist elements there. He preferred to move on Nashville, despite there being little strategic value to the city. Lastly there was Major General Henry Halleck, head of the Department of the Missouri. A respected man, he was loath to bring criticism directly upon himself, perhaps jealous of Grant’s success, and resisted moving in conjunction with Buell due to the disposition of his troops. Given such a myriad of personalities resisted going on the offensive, it is not unreasonable that Lincoln chose to take up the baton of commanding an army.
The breaking point came in January. With McClellan laid up in sick bed with typhoid, Lincoln was left at wits end with how to proceed based on the military and political issues he was faced with. At the advise of Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs, the senior division commanders of the Army of the Potomac were summoned to the White House to offer advice.
In this he found conflicting messages. General McDowell suggested another move against Manassas, similar to his own attempt. Meanwhile General Franklin suggested shifting the Army down the York River, to advance against Richmond from the east. This was more in line with what McClellan sought to do, but these plans would not come to fruition.
The council assembled the next day, with McDowell and Franklin now in favor of the advance on Manassas while new arrivals Meigs and Montgomery Blair opposed the move due to the possibility of it leading to another debacle like the previous battle that took place there. Without a consensus, the meeting was adjourned a second time.
On January 13th, the last of these meetings assembled. They were joined at last by General McClellan, who regarded the meetings as a clandestine conspiracy against him. This left him sullen and uncommunicative, no doubt aggravated by his recovering state. He resisted any effort to inform the President and participating Cabinet members of what he actually intended to do, merely providing scornful and sarcastic remarks about how obvious the course of action needed to be.
Despite every plea made by those present, McClellan stood firm. He insisted that it was better for as few people to know his plans as possible. All he was willing to commit to was a pledge that he did have a plan for when and where he intended to advance, though he revealed neither.
While President Lincoln was the sort to believe the best of men, this was a step too far for him. It was compounded by the fact that, when McClellan was sick and Lincoln had sought to prompt any action at all, he learned that neither Buell nor Halleck knew of any plans McClellan had for their combined armies. For someone whose role was to manage the Union war effort, this was unacceptable.
And so, after much thinking, pondering, and mulling over the possible steps he could take, the decision was made. If Lincoln could not trust his commanders to prosecute the war, then he would have to do so himself.
