If the Triple Entente lost WWI, it is likely that Britain, not France, would have been the most revanchist of the three

If the Triple Entente lost WWI

  • Britain would have been the most revanchist of the three

    Votes: 16 11.3%
  • Russia would have been the most revanchist of the three

    Votes: 74 52.5%
  • France would have been the most revanchist of the three

    Votes: 51 36.2%

  • Total voters
    141
As for UK, I think people need to look at the economic consequences of a German victory on UK, and think what it means for UK after the war and how it will affect British politics. I doubt as example Labour would have any interest in a second round. But more important UK will also be dealing with many of the same colonial problems as in OTL. British politics can very well focus on India.

Leaner times and a stronger Labour probably also mean stronger and more radical Conservatives in response. I agree that reassessing Imperial relationships would be the immediate post-war priority, especially Ireland, but beyond that there's the potential for the political scene to get really ugly.
 
One thing that is worth considering for Britain is, it did have a significant amount of political discontent after WWI when many in the generation that had fought in the trenches raged against the older generation of generals and politicians who had thrown them into the meat-grinder. The rise of Labour in the post-war period is arguably a manifestation of that and, alongside that, the rise of young politicians like Oswald Moseley. Moseley is the 'meme' choice for inter-war British leader and for the token British fascist in the 1930s. His younger self, though, is a very good example of the potential for an almost revanchist politician raging against the old order and the failures of Britain in WW1, because that's exactly what he and many other bright young politicians did IOTL. If Britain has outright lost the war ITTL and endures the same economic difficulties, then I don't think its unreasonable for Moseley or someone like him to claw their way to leadership, probably of the Labour Party (again, Moseley wasn't far off IOTL if he hadn't gone completely rogue in 1930) as the voice of change and opposition to the established order.

Whether they would be 'truly' revanchist is another question, there is the difficulty that Britain doesn't really have any to be revanchist about. But I think its quite plausible for a quasi-revanchist government to arise in Britain to challenge a hegemonic Germany.
 
This is a myth. Who controls Continental Europe controls the ships and shipyards of Continental Europe, and the industrial warfare potential of the continent dwarfs that of the British Isles.
Couple problems here.
1. Even in the most ambitious German victory scenarios Germany would not control all of continental Europe.
2. In 1918 the British economy was larger than the German one in absolute terms despite the Germans having a population 50% larger. The Germans had financed the war almost entirely through borrowing and now faced a debt estimated 440% of GDP (possibly higher ITTL) while the mark has about half the value it used to have.
3. The German tax system was decentralized and the central government seems unlikely to be able or even willing to change that anytime soon.
4. If Germany has won France and Russia are likely in even worse condition.
5. Germany is unlikely to be in a position to impose a debilitating reparation agreement on Britain.
6. The lands in the east taken by Germany for annexation and puppet states are, in many cases, underdeveloped and not under stable government.
7. The lands Germany would be taking in the west were especially uncooperative under occupation and had been stripped of a large part of their productive value.


2-5 mean that Germany is facing an even worse financial situation at the end of the war than France was IOTL. And depending on how attached they are to the idea of protectionism against American goods in their conquered territory (which in OTL proposals was pretty considerable) they will have considerably less recourse to American finance than France did. Interest on loans alone will take up about a third to a half of government income assuming similar levels of government income to GDP as modern nations carry (which is extremely unlikely given the inefficiency of the German tax system). Unless of course they resort to inflating it away. Which has its own costs to pay by transferring the burden from the government to the people.

6 and 7 means that Germany is going to have some unavoidable financial burdens going forward. Ukraine alone required 650,000 men in occupation in 1918 between the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians. And that was only just keeping Skoropadaky’s regime in place. Actually pacifying the place. Particularly to the point that significant and steady grain shipments can be had, will take more. The Baltics will also require troops to keep the Soviets back. Putting a king on the throne of Poland and keeping them in check (or alternatively returning Polish lands to Germany and Austria) are also going to take troops. As will maintaining a puppet state in Belgium, or integrating it along with parts of Northern France. And then there is the Navy, which will need to be maintained (and eventually grown) if Germany wishes to fight Britain in the future. And this is ignoring any intervention in Russia. For reference, Britain had managed to reduce their commitment in men to 1.6 million by 1919 and to 600,000 by 1920. Germany is likely going to require at least 2-3 million in 1919 and probably at least 1.5-2 million in 1920. With a longer and slower drawdown. Even those soldiers demobbed will still represent a pension that needs to be paid. The new areas and puppets will also need investment to gain any kind of industrial value back. This is likely going to eat up the rest of the government budget. And then some most likely.

In other words Germany is going to be in dire financial straights for at least the next decade. Possibly 2.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
When you see the Jerrycans attempting to rule over all of Ruthenia and you have to give them the Supreme Leader Stare:
View attachment 904214
(If Germany attempts to create the Septemberprogramm and continues their 'intervention' in the RCW they will hit a brick wall. Assuming this is just the original peace deal of Poland, Lithuania, and debatably Courtland, then Britain would be the most outwardly hostile unless Kolchak centralizes his rule, then Russia will want to maul Germany to death ASAP. France would just devolve into more internal bickering over pointless internal problems as they did this even when they fucking won.)
Jerrycans?

Are you posting from the Western Desert in 1941?

If not drop the WW II terminology.
 
Jerrycans?

Are you posting from the Western Desert in 1941?

If not drop the WW II terminology.
I am an Italian in the Lybian Desert, please send help this German guy is stretching our supply lines so thin you can call it an elastic defense.

And then the Germans write about how Rommel was a genius because of this.

Anyways back to WW1posting.
 
1. Even in the most ambitious German victory scenarios Germany would not control all of continental Europe.
True. What is arguably also true is that Germany could come fairly close. What is almost indubitably true is that a single power in control of even half of Continental Europe for a prolonged time would be a formidable, frightening and truly dangerous adversary for Britain. The long-time British policy of maintaining a balance of power in Europe to prevent such an adversary from ever emerging was rational.
2. In 1918 the British economy was larger than the German one in absolute terms despite the Germans having a population 50% larger. The Germans had financed the war almost entirely through borrowing and now faced a debt estimated 440% of GDP (possibly higher ITTL) while the mark has about half the value it used to have.
3. The German tax system was decentralized and the central government seems unlikely to be able or even willing to change that anytime soon.
4. If Germany has won France and Russia are likely in even worse condition.
5. Germany is unlikely to be in a position to impose a debilitating reparation agreement on Britain.
6. The lands in the east taken by Germany for annexation and puppet states are, in many cases, underdeveloped and not under stable government.
7. The lands Germany would be taking in the west were especially uncooperative under occupation and had been stripped of a large part of their productive value.


2-5 mean that Germany is facing an even worse financial situation at the end of the war than France was IOTL. And depending on how attached they are to the idea of protectionism against American goods in their conquered territory (which in OTL proposals was pretty considerable) they will have considerably less recourse to American finance than France did. Interest on loans alone will take up about a third to a half of government income assuming similar levels of government income to GDP as modern nations carry (which is extremely unlikely given the inefficiency of the German tax system). Unless of course they resort to inflating it away. Which has its own costs to pay by transferring the burden from the government to the people.

6 and 7 means that Germany is going to have some unavoidable financial burdens going forward. Ukraine alone required 650,000 men in occupation in 1918 between the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians. And that was only just keeping Skoropadaky’s regime in place. Actually pacifying the place. Particularly to the point that significant and steady grain shipments can be had, will take more. The Baltics will also require troops to keep the Soviets back. Putting a king on the throne of Poland and keeping them in check (or alternatively returning Polish lands to Germany and Austria) are also going to take troops. As will maintaining a puppet state in Belgium, or integrating it along with parts of Northern France. And then there is the Navy, which will need to be maintained (and eventually grown) if Germany wishes to fight Britain in the future. And this is ignoring any intervention in Russia. For reference, Britain had managed to reduce their commitment in men to 1.6 million by 1919 and to 600,000 by 1920. Germany is likely going to require at least 2-3 million in 1919 and probably at least 1.5-2 million in 1920. With a longer and slower drawdown. Even those soldiers demobbed will still represent a pension that needs to be paid. The new areas and puppets will also need investment to gain any kind of industrial value back. This is likely going to eat up the rest of the government budget. And then some most likely.

In other words Germany is going to be in dire financial straights for at least the next decade. Possibly 2.
I wasn't thinking about what would be in 1925, but mid-century (circa 1940-1960).
 
To me the reasoning is simple: in a CP victory scenario, especially a late CP victory, France would just be in no position to challenge Germany again: they would Simply suffer too great a demographic and inustrial disadvantage to do that: Russia/Soviet Union would not only have Lost their breadbasket: in a late BL scenario that would also have Lost any strategic depth (without the baltics, Belarus and Ukrane, their main population centers would be weeks away from and invasion) + southern caucasus, depriving them of their main source of oil
 
Also, it's funny how people making stereotypical Central Powers victories misunderstand blitzkrieg, which wasn't some new revolutionary doctrine, but rather your standard Prussian/German doctrine with radios, tanks, and planes. Funnily enough, had the war not happened we probably still get something similar without the stagnant trench war as technology advances, since everyone before WWI put an emphasis on quick, mobile war.
Partially. For Germany the choice post-war would be how to interpret the war lessons. IRL, being stripped of everything and having a army trained two grades above their level meant they went for the most radical option, a war of movement with combined arms and the most modern techonology had to offer. The alternative to this is a war of movement still mainly based on the infantry, just as much a valid option. And for that sake the more tested one coming out of WWI and now needing to police a European or global position.
Isn't modern Russia still fairly industrialized despite having worse borders than Brest Litovsk?
Ukraine contained a disproportionate part of the Russian Empire's industry. The reason the Donbass is the most Russified region of Ukraine today is because the heavy industry there pulled in a lot of migrants from the Moscow region. The industry and food supply of Ukraine allowed the Soviet Union to industrialize to the degree that it did.
If the Bolsheviks come to power it would industrialize however it would be much weaker than IOTL but it would industrialize.
If the Whites win the RCW then it would have similar policies towards industrialization as the RE had post-1905 which means a much longer time before industrialization arrives to USSR levels.
The Whites would have the advantage of being the more attractive option to foreign capital.
And frankly Germany hardly is any kind of threat to Britain and Brits know that very well.
Germany controlling Antwerp in the wake of victory in WWI is the UK's strategic nightmare. The Scheldt is a gunbarrel aimed straight at the heart of the empire, London. Victory in WWI gives Germany space to breathe and more economic potential. It's total dominence of the continent isn't there yet, and Britain will fight tooth and nail to prevent that.
I wasn't thinking about what would be in 1925, but mid-century (circa 1940-1960).
This makes for a wonderfully interesting scenario IMO. A Second World War between Germany and the United Kingdom, with both sides having a late IRL WW2 nuclear weapons stockpile from the get-go. Prepare for a lot of places to end up the way MacArthur wanted the Chinese-Korean border to end up
 
But they would be much less radical in industrializing, despite foreign capital they probably won't reach USSR levels very soon.
No matter the territory it inherits because of the open nature of Germany's victory, the USSR would industrialize harder and be excluded from a stock market crash, but a White Russia would not suffer famines to the degree the USSR did/would. Add on top of that the increased ability to trade and perhaps a increased availability of foreign specialists.
 
No matter the territory it inherits because of the open nature of Germany's victory, the USSR would industrialize harder and be excluded from a stock market crash, but a White Russia would not suffer famines to the degree the USSR did/would. Add on top of that the increased ability to trade and perhaps a increased availability of foreign specialists.
White Russia would be quite unstable (both because they're hated and because they don't have a unified government), dominated by the more conservative elements of Russian society and would be isolated for a while. The USSR is simply on another level than anything the Whites would achieve.
If Germany wins WW1 I doubt there would be something similar to the 1929 Wall Street Crash, it was a consequence of the US winning WW1 as Imperial Germany is very unlikely to create the same inflationary bubble and the response of the government would be very different (the US idea of non-intervention into the economy is one of the main reason why it was so bad, combined with Hoover's stupid decisions).
 
White Russia would be quite unstable (both because they're hated and because they don't have a unified government), dominated by the more conservative elements of Russian society and would be isolated for a while. The USSR is simply on another level than anything the Whites would achieve.
Oh yes I fully admit that, but a White Russia taps into more trade and foreign policy options. Russia's inability to project power into contentious area's for a long time will allow it to build a somewhat stable alliance with Britain.
If Germany wins WW1 I doubt there would be something similar to the 1929 Wall Street Crash, it was a consequence of the US winning WW1 as Imperial Germany is very unlikely to create the same inflationary bubble and the response of the government would be very different (the US idea of non-intervention into the economy is one of the main reason why it was so bad, combined with Hoover's stupid decisions).
Depending on the nature of Germany's victory, economic problems do not exist (early German victory) or much earlier (late German victory). The Entente was financed by the UK, who in term had to get their money from US bankers. If the Entente loses, the UK loses, and if the UK loses, Wall Street loses. The economic instability will last into the early 20'ies, followed by recovery from halfway in the decade which will also see the Anglo-German rivalry intensify
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Assuming that Britain effectively withdraws from WW1 rather than suffer a massive naval defeat, or succumb to USW, or mislay some colonies...

France, having lost twice to Germany in 45 years, will burn for revenge but will not be able to do anything on their own.

Russia would have the ability to become effectively revanchist as the CP would be unable to occupy all of the important parts of the Russian Empire beyond the border states, something that France cannot do.

But, would a revanchist Russia be good for the British Empire? Could it leave Britain more willing to seek some sort of accommodation with the new European order, if Germany has been unable to force any meaningful conditions as part of the peace?
 
Depending on the nature of Germany's victory, economic problems do not exist (early German victory) or much earlier (late German victory). The Entente was financed by the UK, who in term had to get their money from US bankers. If the Entente loses, the UK loses, and if the UK loses, Wall Street loses. The economic instability will last into the early 20'ies, followed by recovery from halfway in the decade which will also see the Anglo-German rivalry intensify
It will cause economic problems however once they recover there (likely) won't be a catastrophe like Wall Street, US businessman lose money but nowhere near what is happening in Europe and the US became the economic centre of the world as a consequence of WW1 so even if the US ends up having a similar crash it will affect mostly the US.
I don't think the Anglo-German rivalry is particularly strong, the British will be mostly licking their wounds, going into another European war would be suicidal.
Without the Bolsheviks, Russia's economy is healthier and they enjoy a higher quality of life by 2024 than OTL, but they probably have a similar per capita GDP.
I disagree with that, GDP per capita will be similar around the 50's but Russia will have a much bigger economy than what the Soviets mismanaged and then the economic hardship of the 90's.
 
Last edited:
I don't think they're going to be revanchist, they're going to be paranoid.
The "Invasion Novel" genre archives absurd heights as British fears of a massive invasion of "the jerries" become way, way more real.
And not entirely baseless.
Germany controlling Antwerp in the wake of victory in WWI is the UK's strategic nightmare. The Scheldt is a gunbarrel aimed straight at the heart of the empire, London. Victory in WWI gives Germany space to breathe and more economic potential. It's total dominence of the continent isn't there yet, and Britain will fight tooth and nail to prevent that.
That's what I think.
Germany won and is hegemonic in continental Europe for at least a generation. And that's immensely terrifying to Britain.
Because one continental state like France, Germany, Spain or Russia will never be able to gain the resources needed to beat Britain on the sea.
One of those states dominating Almost All of Europe? The British will panic. Its Napoleon all over again.

Sure, Germany is no real threat to Britain in the 1920 or 1930s. But by late 1930s, 1940s and 1950s? Its a very real threat. And if they manage to somehow beat Russia in that period, its all over but the screaming.

There are three powers which Britain could use against Germany: France, Russia and Italy. Possily more minor powers as well.
Considering how the British treated Napoleon, its immensely optimistic to expect that the British won't treat like they treated Napoleon.
Even from a cold economic logic, Germany will defacto try and eject Britain from the European economy, just like France tried to do in the Napoleonic Wars. The difference is that back then, Britain was the only truly industrial country, and circa 1910s, Britain is just Number One. Germany could very well replace Britain in most european markets.
 
Without the Bolsheviks, Russia's economy is healthier and they enjoy a higher quality of life by 2024 than OTL, but they probably have a similar per capita GDP.
Russia is probably larger as well. Again, much depends on the way Germany wins as to how Russia's western border is settled, but the indiginization (hope I spelled that right) of the USSR and its constituent republics will not take place. I can well see Kazachstan being Russian in 2024
Assuming that Britain effectively withdraws from WW1 rather than suffer a massive naval defeat, or succumb to USW, or mislay some colonies...

France, having lost twice to Germany in 45 years, will burn for revenge but will not be able to do anything on their own.

Russia would have the ability to become effectively revanchist as the CP would be unable to occupy all of the important parts of the Russian Empire beyond the border states, something that France cannot do.

But, would a revanchist Russia be good for the British Empire? Could it leave Britain more willing to seek some sort of accommodation with the new European order, if Germany has been unable to force any meaningful conditions as part of the peace?
Britain retreating from the war will be on terms it agrees to. It will want to agree to a France that isn't fully dead weight. It will lose land, it will pay endemnities, but the Rijsel industrial area will remain French and Belgium will remain independent. France will be able to put up a defensive fight again after a decade or two of recovery. And Russia is a mixed bag. A revanchist Russia will ofcourse look to expand to those sweet, sweet warm water ports as well. However, it will also be a key ally of Britain to contain Germany and Russia will also want Britain as a ally. It's a fine line that's to be walked, but also depends a lot again on Germany's victory. A Russia that holds on to Ukraine will have a more strained relationship with London.
 
Top