Consequences of No Restoration of the French Parlements?

What it says on the tin.

Louis XVI made the "mistake" at the outset of his reign of restoring the French provincial parlements. After the praise which his grandfather had received for finally abolishing them just a few short years earlier, this was very much a regressive move.

My question is what would've happened with the French crown had these parlements not been restored. We know that the restoration caused nothing but trouble going forward, since it was the parlements' refusal to register the king's reforms which led to the fateful summoning of the Estates General.

But is it as simple as saying that the parlements not being restored would simplify the king attempting to pass reforms? There would, doubtless, still be opposition towards the reforms by those see their privileges curtailed, but how would they go about expressing their discontent if they are unable to block these? Also, given that the Revolution abolished the parlements anyway, what effects would this have on the powers of the French king?

@DrakeRlugia @Emperor Constantine
 
depends. a big part of why the french revolution spiraled was because XVI needed the parliament to control taxation, and the traditional method (i.e one vote per estate) obviously didn't work. if the king controlled taxation, then competent advisors would be able to solve a lot of the problem- but not all of it
 
Damn, I love the late French monarchy and the many what-ifs on how to save it, but I'm sorely lacking in the knowledge of the intimate details. Yet another reason why I need to crack open that dusty Citizens from Sir Simon Schama.
a big part of why the french revolution spiraled was because XVI needed the parliament to control taxation, and the traditional method (i.e one vote per estate) obviously didn't work. if the king controlled taxation, then competent advisors would be able to solve a lot of the problem- but not all of it
This is my general understanding of it. Restoring the Parlements was like calling the firemen after the house had already burnt down. The state was broke and needed cash, but restoring the Parlements did a real number on Louis XVI's political control, helping accelerate his downfall. Not restoring the Parlements might help preserve the authority of the monarchy, but the King needs his cash stat.
 
This is my general understanding of it. Restoring the Parlements was like calling the firemen after the house had already burnt down. The state was broke and needed cash, but restoring the Parlements did a real number on Louis XVI's political control, helping accelerate his downfall. Not restoring the Parlements might help preserve the authority of the monarchy, but the King needs his cash stat
To be clear, this isn't really xvi's fault. It was his dad who reopend the parliaments first, and if he hadn't, xvi probably could've just said "the parliament hasn't met in a century, there's no way it could efficiently solve the problem"
 
To be clear, this isn't really xvi's fault. It was his dad who reopend the parliaments first, and if he hadn't, xvi probably could've just said "the parliament hasn't met in a century, there's no way it could efficiently solve the problem"

Eh, two different things. The Parlements were appellate courts with quasi legislative powers; the Parliament you're thinking of was the Estates-General. Very similar names, but different messes. Moreover, his father the Dauphin was not involved with either of those things; his grandfather Louis XV succeeded in dissolving the Parlements, and the Estates-General hadn't been called sense Louis XIII, nearly 2 centuries earlier.
 
Yes, as Constantine says, the term Parlement can be confusing. The French Parlements were legal courts (essentially provincial appellate courts). They did not have any sort of legislative power, but held judicial power over a wide range of issues, especially taxation.

The big issue following Louis XIV's death through the reigns of Louis XV and XVI is that that the provincial Parlements repeatedly challenged the crown for control and power over policy, particularly where it concerned taxation and religious issues. Louis XV sought to ensure the crown was the dominant party and had sole control over such issue. The major issue re: taxation was equal taxation; Louis XV attempted to create new taxes dating back to the Seven Years War where everyone would be liable to pay, but such taxation policies were opposed by Parlement—the Parlementarians being major defenders of aristocratic rights. France's 18th century tax burden was heavily unequal.

Louis XV in his reforms had certain political powers of the Parlements limited, their right to remonstrance (a formal statement of grievances, but typically used to block royal legislation/edicts) was limited, and many of the larger Parlements were split and turned into superior courts. The venality of Parliamentary offices were also abolished, with magistrates appointed by the king and paid by the state. The big issue was that these reforms were opposed by the nobility and the old magistrates, but it seems that a greater issue was Louis XVI's succession: there was little chance he was going to support the policy of Maupeou, an ardent partisan of the Comtesse du Barry or even keep him in office. Louis XVI's replacement for Maupeou, Maurepas desired to take his revenge upon Maupeou and took down the triumvirate of Maupeou, Terray, and d'Aiguillion—Maurepas was a major supporter of recalling the Parlements and reviving the greatest enemy of royal power and it's largest critic.
 
Just thinking things through in a sequential form, assuming that Louis XVI still passes similar tax reforms:
  • Louis XVI's tax reforms imposes his reforms (well, reforms created by his ministers).
  • Many, if not most, nobles are still up in arms.
  • Since the nobles lack a "normal" way of addressing their grievances, they are going to look for alternative methods.
  • Open rebellion at this point is too early, what would probably happen first is attempts to slander the king & find allies against him.
  • The most likely ally would be the bourgeoise, they can be easily promised higher positions. (Many clergy would side with the nobles, but this would probably be more of a side effect. Clergy who came from noble families would probably side with the nobles & those who didn't may not.)
It's hard to do more, without filling in the spaces between the bullets.
 
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The most likely ally would be the bourgeoise, they can be easily promised higher positions.

This one raises a question as far as what could have been and what was not a possibility: What stops the bourgeoise from seeing the King as a better ally than the nobility? Their goals and interests? The King's? Just no one seeing there as a point to that?
 
What it says on the tin.

Louis XVI made the "mistake" at the outset of his reign of restoring the French provincial parlements. After the praise which his grandfather had received for finally abolishing them just a few short years earlier, this was very much a regressive move.

My question is what would've happened with the French crown had these parlements not been restored. We know that the restoration caused nothing but trouble going forward, since it was the parlements' refusal to register the king's reforms which led to the fateful summoning of the Estates General.

Meant to respond earlier, but to take a closer look at my Alt Louis XVI TL notes. Anyway, the Parlements. Basically their reform (and this is a major thing people should remember; the Parlements were to be replaced with new courts and councils staffed by various royal officials that were outside the hereditary Noblesse de la Robe) would completely shift the balance of power in favor of the Crown administratively, legislatively and judicially, creating a true absolute monarchy. Judicially, this frees the bourgeois and commoners from a very lopsided legal system (as part of the Maupeou reforms was meant to cut the need for plaintiffs to pay the Judge to hear their cases) and pushes toward the creation of a single legal code (another proposal of Maupeou that wasn't finished until Napoléon); financially this frees the Crown from having to negotiate with the nobles and clerics; and administratively helps push toward a fully unified nation (as the various parlements and sovereign courts were often tied to the pre-existing provincial administrations that had been left in place for centuries).

But is it as simple as saying that the parlements not being restored would simplify the king attempting to pass reforms? There would, doubtless, still be opposition towards the reforms by those see their privileges curtailed, but how would they go about expressing their discontent if they are unable to block these? Also, given that the Revolution abolished the parlements anyway, what effects would this have on the powers of the French king?

Basically? Yes, it would be that easy. The Parlements were the legal mechanism that enabled the nobility (and to a lesser extent the Church) to oppose any major reforms of the system that would threaten their financial privileges. Without that mechanism, they don't really have another avenue to protest outside of attempting an armed rebellion (a la the Fronde). At most, they could withdraw from Court as a protest or delay paying their new taxes. But that's really it.

Of course, any successful financial reform would also depend on deciding on a plan and fully carrying it out. Considering there were three or four different course changes from 1774 to 1789, that's an easier said then done situation. Personally, I think Calonne's reforms in the early-mid 1780s were the best bet, but that' a bit out of the initial question.
 
Of course, any successful financial reform would also depend on deciding on a plan and fully carrying it out. Considering there were three or four different course changes from 1774 to 1789, that's an easier said then done situation. Personally, I think Calonne's reforms in the early-mid 1780s were the best bet, but that' a bit out of the initial question.
I definitely agree re: Calonne, though I think his reforms came a bit too late given the terrible shape of France's finances by the mid-late 1780s. He was essentially trying to plug a cork into a leak when the whole ship is almost entirely sank.

But I think his views were at least the most based in reality. Anything would be an improvement over Turgot trying to liberalize the grain trade and plundering the country into a food crisis barely a year later. Necker was prudent and innovative in some areas, in others not (IMO his taking out loans to help fund / pay down France's debt was reckless, and I disagree profoundly with his restoration of the Ferme Générale in 1780, even if their numbers were reduced and they were more strictly watched over).

I think the main issue re: the crown's financial issue is not just trying to overhaul France's financial system, but it's economy as well—France in 1774 is still essentially a patchwork of different provinces all with their own customs duties. France didn't just have external customs duties on the border of the kingdom, but there were internal customs duties as well—a large swath of France (Normandie, Picardie, Champagne, Bourgogne, Bresse, Bourbonnais, Berry, Poitou, Aunis, Anjou, Maine, Île-de-France, Orléanais, Touraine, Beaujolais, and Dombes) was part of the so-called Étendue which was covered by the Five Big Farms that handled the Gabelle, Octroi de Paris (tax on goods entering Paris), ect. The Étendue allowed free internal trade between these provinces and export duties into other provinces were uniform.

The Provinces Réputées Étrangères were "provinces deemed foreign" and defined as such by Colbert during Louis XIV's reign: Angoumois, Artois, Auvergne, Brittany, Dauphiné, Flanders, Guyenne, Languedoc, Limousin, Lyonnais, Forez, Périgord, Provence, Roussillon, Saintogne, Béarn, Soule, and Basse-Navarre. Trade duties in these provinces were high and paid on trade between these provinces and also other provinces.

You also had the Provinces à l'Instar de l'Étranger Effectif or "effectively foreign provinces" such as Alsace, Franche-Comté, the Three Bishoprics, Lorraine, Barrois, and Labourd. These provinces could trade freely with foreign states but paid customs duties to trade with other French provinces. There were "free ports" in Dunkirk, Bayonne, and Marseille were considered part of these, while the province of Gex from Burgundy was added in 1775.

Aside from these barriers for trade, there was also the French State Debt—this included not only the debts ran up from the American Revolution (1.3 billion Livres—more than double the crown's annual revenue) but the debts from previous conflicts: The Seven Years War had cost France nearly 1.8 billion Livres, while the War of the Austrian Succession had cost 1 billion Livres. This put France in a rather impossible situation: to maintain their international standing, they have to get involved into conflicts which end up being costly and expensive, but were funding them with a system that was both archaic and inefficient. The issue with aiding the Americans was not so much that they chose to do so, but that it was done primarily through loans and municipal bonds and was probably the first conflict where a King of France waged war without raising taxes. This meant issues later on, since these debts accumulated on top of debts already acquired in the previous reign. In 1780, about 43% of the total budget was dedicated to serving the debt. It was a catastrophic situation waiting to happen.
 
This one raises a question as far as what could have been and what was not a possibility: What stops the bourgeoise from seeing the King as a better ally than the nobility? Their goals and interests? The King's? Just no one seeing there as a point to that?
In reality, not much considering I'm sure most of the promises would be empty, however, the king isn't looking for allies in a conflict.

Even once some sort of conflict becomes apparent, he would take the same "father of all France" attitude he did in OTL.

Meanwhile, the nobles could promise "expanding their privilege" to include certain bourgeois & a voice in however they modify the government to keep this from happening again.

Unlike the other commoners, they would be close enough to actually imagine themselves as minor nobility, heck, a few of them already had more money & power then the minor rural nobility they just lacked a title & privileges.

[Edited]
 
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The issue with aiding the Americans was not so much that they chose to do so, but that it was done primarily through loans and municipal bonds and was probably the first conflict where a King of France waged war without raising taxes.
it didn't help that the Americans also renegged on the deal to pay back the French loans
 
Aside from these barriers for trade, there was also the French State Debt—this included not only the debts ran up from the American Revolution (1.3 billion Livres—more than double the crown's annual revenue) but the debts from previous conflicts: The Seven Years War had cost France nearly 1.8 billion Livres, while the War of the Austrian Succession had cost 1 billion Livres. This put France in a rather impossible situation: to maintain their international standing, they have to get involved into conflicts which end up being costly and expensive, but were funding them with a system that was both archaic and inefficient. The issue with aiding the Americans was not so much that they chose to do so, but that it was done primarily through loans and municipal bonds and was probably the first conflict where a King of France waged war without raising taxes. This meant issues later on, since these debts accumulated on top of debts already acquired in the previous reign. In 1780, about 43% of the total budget was dedicated to serving the debt. It was a catastrophic situation waiting to happen.
Given all this, what would have happened if the French Crown had simply declared bankruptcy and announced it wasn't going to pay its existing debts, a la Philip II of Spain? Obviously it would have been a blow to the Crown's prestige, but would it have been a temporary embarrassment that the country would soon recover from, or would it precipitate a crisis of confidence and send the country into an economic tailspin?
 
Given all this, what would have happened if the French Crown had simply declared bankruptcy and announced it wasn't going to pay its existing debts, a la Philip II of Spain? Obviously it would have been a blow to the Crown's prestige, but would it have been a temporary embarrassment that the country would soon recover from, or would it precipitate a crisis of confidence and send the country into an economic tailspin?
To be honest, by the last years of the Ancien Régime (essentially in 1788-89) they had essentially run into issues of paying their short term debts. The financial system was a mess, hence the summoning of the Assembly of Notables and later the Estates General. When we talk about France's debt in the period, it's easy to imagine a shadowy syndicate of foreign bankers holding such debts, but in reality much of the crown's debts was held by French citizens. In the later period (1781-89) France did negotiate some high interest loans with Dutch bankers out of Amsterdam, but a great deal of money was primarily found internally either through the rentes of the Hôtel de Ville in Paris to the clerical subsidies granted through the Assembly of the Clergy—where in the Roman Catholic Church in France provided the crown with subsidies to pay down the national debt, but in reality these subsides were used merely to take out fresh loans. In the mid-18th century, investment into the clerical debts were considered one of the safest investments one could make.

The main issue with defaulting is that when defaults happened (such as Philip II) these were not wholesale repudiations of the entire debt. It was typically a section of total debts, typically those with the highest interest rates or those who held the debt that were perhaps the weakest or most unpopular. Typically defaults were used as a tactic to renegotiate interest rates; payments might be suspended during times of crisis (as France did during the 7W) or certain they might use such threats to convert short term debts / loans, typically with higher interest rates into more long term loans with lower interest rates. Philip II did this when Charles V died, as did Henri II, IIRC.

There is no way that France would be able to repudiate their whole entire debt without sending the country into an economic meltdown. Much of Louis XVI's political capital had been built up in the task of seeking a solution to pay off France's massive debts, as well. Repudiating the whole of the debt would be an impossible task, but trying to alter some of the interest rates or the length of loans might be more successful. Even when France defaulted in 1796, for instance, bondholders were given 1/3 of their original investment in 5% consolidated bonds that wouldn't mature until 1802.

So, the better solution would not be a wholesale repudiation (ala the Bolsheviks in 1918) which would be impossible in this period, but a partial default akin to 1726, 1759, or 1770.
 
There are a few issues related to older financial systems that need to be born in mind.

1. Money is Specie. If you borrow 1000 livres of gold at some point you have to have 1000 livres of metal, or an acceptance that promissory notes have face value.

2. The government has expenses which have to be paid out in coin. The army, the navy, the grocer supplying Versailles with garlic. And a lot of the expenditure is directly or indirectly supporting the bourgeoisie. Unless you can restructure so expenditure is at least matching income (well projected income at a future date) all you are doing is deferring the date of bankruptcy. At which point anyone lending will know about your track record and price accordingly.

3. While you can restructure loans and for some people this is easy. Instead of 5% over 5 years 1% over 15 may be a better deal. For others the income from the investment ( which is what the loan is to them) may be necessary in order to live.

4. The Noblesse de Robe have paid for their office. The most familiar in the English world would be purchase of army commissions. You bought it, you paid for it and you get the income and benefits from it. And you can sell it. This is a vast vested interest.

5. To override the existing system and introduce new taxes if it to have any effect means you have to have a mechanism for collecting the taxes from people who may not actually want to pay them. This means a civil service large and capable enough to do this. And they will expect to be paid in some way. Part of the reason for tax farming is to avoid paying salaries to tax collectors.

All of this is essentially revolutionary. It may be a Royal Revolution but you will need the support of the Organs of State Security who have to be willing and able to enforce the King's Will, and remain obedient and subservient to the King's Will. Which is going to be punitive, very punitive. Its a lot easier to do that if you actual revolutionaries who have some form of message and are willing to reset the world to l'An I to do this, and do the initial financing by expropriating the richest parts of the Old Regime and quartering the army on foreign lands who will pay for it, or else. Napoleon is able to do what he does because all potential opposition is dead in exile or has benefited. One of issues in 19th century France is those who benefited are very opposed to changing their status quo.
 
but a great deal of money was primarily found internally either through the rentes of the Hôtel de Ville in Paris to the clerical subsidies granted through the Assembly of the Clergy
so there was some truth to the statement (can't remember if it was Calonne or Necker that said it) that the French had the money but they were hiding it away in their drawers and bureaus instead of using it to boost the economy
 
so there was some truth to the statement (can't remember if it was Calonne or Necker that said it) that the French had the money but they were hiding it away in their drawers and bureaus instead of using it to boost the economy
Indeed, most of the French royal debt was held internally—not externally. Most of those which held investments in French debt in the period of the 18th century were also those who had the means to do so: this was just the wealthy bourgeoisie who were quickly growing and becoming influential (such as those who had their start in the Ferme Générale during the later period of Louis XIV's reign and the earliest periods of Louis XV's reign) but more importantly the wealthy aristocracy—the very same class seeking to protect their estate from taxation.

IMO, it was not just so much that they were seeking to defend their estate from being taxed: by Louis XVI's reign, the nobility were liable to pay some taxes—primarily the capitulation (poll tax) established in 1695 by Louis XIV. It was repealed in 1698, but later reintroduced in 1704 and remained until the end of the Ancien Régime. The amounts were minimal: the largest payment was 2000 livres owed by the Dauphin and the Princes of the Blood; Princes and Dukes were liable to pay 1500; Knights and Officers of the Ordre du Saint-Esprit owed 1000—this went downward from 500, 400, and 300 owed by various officials to 250, which was owed by Marquises, Counts, Viscounts, and Barons—with even smaller amounts being owed by other sectors of French society: Millers whose leases were at least 2000 livres owed 40 Livres, while physicians and surgeons in Paris owed 20 Livres. Even further down included the 3 livres levied upon physicians and surgeons in smaller towns, craftsmen of towns and villages who owed 2 Livres, down to 1 Livre—owed by common soldiers, married shepherds, various apprentices, and servants and lackeys. The capitulation was very hierarchical, but did not really demand great amounts: of France's noble families, there were perhaps 250 families who had incomes greater than 50,000 Livres and whose capitulation tax was more than 500 Livres—the majority of these 250 families resided either in Paris or at court. The second group of noble families comprised of 3500 families: these were the wealthy provincial nobility, and their annual incomes were anywhere from 10,000 Livres to 50,000 Livres—a yearly income of 10,000 Livres was considered the bare minimum for provincial luxury and most of these families were able to live lavishly in the provinces and likely paid the minimum on the capitulation tax (250 Livres)—a small sum considered. Below this group was some 7000 noble families whose incomes ranged from 4,000 Livres to 10,000 Livres which allowed for a comfortable life; some 11,000 families had incomes ranging from 1,000 Livres to 4,000 Livres—which still allowed for a fairly comfortable life if they were frugal. The last group of nobles made less than 1,000 Livres per annum—some 5,000 families were at this level: some had less than 500 Livres per annum, others had 100 or even 50. This group paid nothing towards the capitulation tax, or very little. The big issue re: the capitulation was that the nobility were able to appoint their own assessors, which allowed them the escape most of the burden (in one calculation, they escaped 7/8's of the amount due). The Clergy were also exempted in 1709 with the payment of a subsidy of 24 Million Livres. Various provinces and towns managed to gain exemptions too.

Aside from the capitulation, there was the Vingtième introduced by Louis XV—first in 1749 and again in 1756 and 1760. The Vingtième was an income tax like the Dixième levied during Louis XIV's reign, and was meant to collect one-twentieth of everyone's annual income, and was to be collected directly by the government. Like the above tax, the First and Second Estates were able to purchase exemptions through a payment of the Don Gratiut to the crown (essentially a free gift, or lump sum payment). Two other Vingtièmes were levied during the Seven Years War: the last was abolished, but the first two remained. Much like the capitulation, there was wrangling over how it the tax might be collected and how it would be assessed: Bertin, Louis XV's Controller-General sought land surveys, but the Parlements resisted this idea, and Bertin was later sacked. When Laverdy succeeded him, the Paris Parlement agreed that the tax could be levied, but it would be based on old property assessments, meaning that the income of the tax wouldn't grow as the national income did. Maupeou and Terray attempted to make improvements, but the Vingtième largely remained inefficient. Calonne abolished it in 1786 to replace it with new taxes, but the controversy and his fall from office meant that nothing was accomplished. Brienne eventually settled matters and had the Second Vingtième extended in 1787 (unlike the first, it was regularly extended through the 1760s-1780s), and it remained until 1790.

The primary issue with these taxes were:
a) Their collection was extremely inefficient
b) They had baked in exemptions or had loop-holes to allow the First and Second Estates to become exempt; those that could exempt themselves did
c) Proper assessment was almost impossible: for the nobility, the amounts their paid were sometimes laughably miniscule compared to their incomes
d) Put even further burdens upon the Third Estate, already liable for various other taxes
 
to set a cat amongst the pigeons here, but what if OTL Louis XVIII had been in charge in 1774- say XVI dies shortly before his marriage to Antoinette and XVIII gets shoe-horned in as replacement groom. We know that XVIII opposed the restoration of the parlements, commenting that he had no wish to see the king of France "become as powerful as the doge of Genoa". He also supported his brother against getting involved in the ARW and felt marginally betrayed when his brother finally caved into Ben Franklin (a man they (and Antoinette) despised).
 
to set a cat amongst the pigeons here, but what if OTL Louis XVIII had been in charge in 1774- say XVI dies shortly before his marriage to Antoinette and XVIII gets shoe-horned in as replacement groom. We know that XVIII opposed the restoration of the parlements, commenting that he had no wish to see the king of France "become as powerful as the doge of Genoa". He also supported his brother against getting involved in the ARW and felt marginally betrayed when his brother finally caved into Ben Franklin (a man they (and Antoinette) despised).
That would be interesting
 
to set a cat amongst the pigeons here, but what if OTL Louis XVIII had been in charge in 1774- say XVI dies shortly before his marriage to Antoinette and XVIII gets shoe-horned in as replacement groom. We know that XVIII opposed the restoration of the parlements, commenting that he had no wish to see the king of France "become as powerful as the doge of Genoa". He also supported his brother against getting involved in the ARW and felt marginally betrayed when his brother finally caved into Ben Franklin (a man they (and Antoinette) despised).
Having the OTL Louis XVIII end up as his grandfather's successor instead of Louis XVI would certainly be a very interesting thought process: I'd definitely say out of three of Louis XV's grandsons, Louis XVIII was probably the one with the most political aptitude. Unfortunately I don't know too much about Louis XVIII's political thoughts during the Ancien Régime, beyond that he was dissatisfied by the royal policies of appeasement and openness towards certain ideas of the Enlightenment. He played a role in agitating against Turgot, Necker, and Calonne—and helped block Calonne's reforms by declaring them unconstitutional in his role as a president of one of the offices of the Assembly of Notables. We also know that he didn't have a completely conservative bent ala the Comte d'Artois—Louis XVIII was one of the members as part of the Assembly of Notables in 1788 that voted to grant double representation to the Third Estate, though Louis XVIII would later call this "One of the greatest faults," of his life.

He certainly seems a character that might be better equipped to handle the problems of late 18th century France—certainly better than Louis XVI, for he was ill-equipped for the role of king and deeply indecisive. Too often Louis XVI valued the goodwill of the general public. A common remark from Louis XVI: "It may be considered politically unwise, but it seems to me to be the general wish, and I want to be loved." He also felt bound to the general public and said that he "must always consult public opinion; it is never wrong."

I know one major issue when Louis XVI became king was that he had been allegedly told by his father the late Dauphin to ask the advice of his sister, Madame Adélaïde, should he ever become king. When Louis XVI did as he was told and sent her a letter asking for her advice, she replied with a list of minister candidates that had been suggested by his father. She also took control of her late brother's papers which had instructions for Louis XVI when he became king—the letters suggested three men for the role of Prime Minister: Maurepas, d'Aigullion, and d'Arnouville. d'Aigullion did not last long as foreign minister because of his quarrels with Marie-Antoinette, and Arnouville was never brought back into office. Maurepas however became chief minister, and played a role in the Parlements being recalled—and of course played a role in bringing Turgot into office among others.

I do think that if Louis XVIII is the successor, he would have the wherewithal to name his own candidates and wouldn't allow himself to be swayed by his aunt nor the memorials of his father.
 
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