No apologies needed, enjoy your holidays and grandchildren.
Since there where no comments on your timeline, I thought that there was something wrong with the forum :-D
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Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Since there where no comments on your timeline, I thought that there was something wrong with the forum :-D
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Parma, been there, wondered why the author hadn't done another post on the timeline I had been following, being selfish, and then guilty as they might not be well or otherwise indisposed due to Real Life.
PM'd recently with Coxy, he is working on posts. Look at time line .. war is imminent. Plus he is enjoying his real life.
If not stuck in an airport somewhere with a couple of hyperactive grandchildren 😂
Considering the airtravel nightmare of the last few days.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Cuchulainn, thank god no, all local, although my trip along the M25 and up the M1 this morning to our youngest grandchild, may become an ordeal, you never know what the traffic conditions may turn too!
On a more serious note, and completely off tangent, I have my suspicions that the Air traffic Control data glitch which has caused such mayhem is quite possibly the result of a Russian backed cyber attack. In isolation I'd have bought the 'just a data glitch' thing, but the resent data breaches on both the Metropolitan and Northern Ireland police forces, makes me think the unspoken cyber war has heated up! Or am I just an old cynic?
MWI 41111113 The Gunners
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Tuesday 11 November;
The Gun Commanders held their right arms up, all along the line of four guns, watching their GPO, awaiting the order. “Fire number one” called the Lieutenant, “Fire number one” called the Sergeant at Gun One, his arm swinging down, ‘BANG’, the 4.5in Howitzer roared out, as a reduced charge fired a shell on down the artillery range at Port
Swettenham.
“Fire number two”, the orders flowing down the line, guns roaring, and the gun detachments, stripped to the waist, some brown backs, some white, highlighting their time of service in Malaya, working feverously to reloaded their guns. Orders of adjustments to range were called out, elevation and traverse being accordingly adjusted, before the Gun Commanders raised their arms, ready again.
This was the first live ammunition firing exercise for B battery, 160th Field Artillery Regt RA. The Regt been raised back in May from A Btty of the 155th Field Regt, quickly expanded to two Bttys, bringing her in line with the other artillery regiments in Malaya. Wartime expansion was being held back by the lack of experienced men and available guns, indeed the 4.5in Howitzer was a relic of World War One, but there simply wasn’t enough 25 pounders to equip all the new regiments. Consequently, in a backwater like Malaya, artillery units were equipped with the 4.5in How, 18 Pounders, another veteran of WW1, or worse still, 3-inch mortars.
Extra personnel were constantly being drip fed into the artillery units, as they arrived in Malaya, taking them over their two-battery establishment strength, with a view to creating the third battery. Some of the new batteries would inherit the Howitzers, as other regiments converted over to the 25 Pounders, a lucky few would be given 25 Pounders to start, but most would begin life with the 3-inch Mortar, this being quick and easy to manufacture. The 160th wasn’t operational yet, that wouldn’t be until the end of the year, when as a two-battery regiment she would join the order of battle. Her third battery would hopefully be raised in December, and operational sometime in April 1942, dependant on the arrival of more men and guns.
The other Royal Artillery Regts in Malaya, the 5th, 122nd and 155th, also currently two battery Regts would have their third batteries join in January, February and March consecutively. At least one Regt would re-equip at this time with the 25 Pdr, their old guns going to the expanding Malay and Singapore (Chinese) artillery batteries. Better news was the 22nd Mountain Regt IA, and both independent batteries spun off from it were now fully operational. The 22nd was now with the 11th Indian Division, deploying among the Jitra line defences, as was the 26th Independent Mtn Battery, while the 7th Independent Bty was now in Kelantan with the Indian 8th Brigade.
The Gun Commanders held their right arms up, all along the line of four guns, watching their GPO, awaiting the order. “Fire number one” called the Lieutenant, “Fire number one” called the Sergeant at Gun One, his arm swinging down, ‘BANG’, the 4.5in Howitzer roared out, as a reduced charge fired a shell on down the artillery range at Port
Swettenham.
“Fire number two”, the orders flowing down the line, guns roaring, and the gun detachments, stripped to the waist, some brown backs, some white, highlighting their time of service in Malaya, working feverously to reloaded their guns. Orders of adjustments to range were called out, elevation and traverse being accordingly adjusted, before the Gun Commanders raised their arms, ready again.
This was the first live ammunition firing exercise for B battery, 160th Field Artillery Regt RA. The Regt been raised back in May from A Btty of the 155th Field Regt, quickly expanded to two Bttys, bringing her in line with the other artillery regiments in Malaya. Wartime expansion was being held back by the lack of experienced men and available guns, indeed the 4.5in Howitzer was a relic of World War One, but there simply wasn’t enough 25 pounders to equip all the new regiments. Consequently, in a backwater like Malaya, artillery units were equipped with the 4.5in How, 18 Pounders, another veteran of WW1, or worse still, 3-inch mortars.
Extra personnel were constantly being drip fed into the artillery units, as they arrived in Malaya, taking them over their two-battery establishment strength, with a view to creating the third battery. Some of the new batteries would inherit the Howitzers, as other regiments converted over to the 25 Pounders, a lucky few would be given 25 Pounders to start, but most would begin life with the 3-inch Mortar, this being quick and easy to manufacture. The 160th wasn’t operational yet, that wouldn’t be until the end of the year, when as a two-battery regiment she would join the order of battle. Her third battery would hopefully be raised in December, and operational sometime in April 1942, dependant on the arrival of more men and guns.
The other Royal Artillery Regts in Malaya, the 5th, 122nd and 155th, also currently two battery Regts would have their third batteries join in January, February and March consecutively. At least one Regt would re-equip at this time with the 25 Pdr, their old guns going to the expanding Malay and Singapore (Chinese) artillery batteries. Better news was the 22nd Mountain Regt IA, and both independent batteries spun off from it were now fully operational. The 22nd was now with the 11th Indian Division, deploying among the Jitra line defences, as was the 26th Independent Mtn Battery, while the 7th Independent Bty was now in Kelantan with the Indian 8th Brigade.
The artillery sounds bad but then those are lighter pieces right? More usable in the Jungle against a highly mobile Japanese army???
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
Another small improvement in the British forces, their is now more trained artillery available, even if it isn’t equipped with the latest weapons. However given that the Japanese themselves don’t have the most modern artillery in comparison to the British, and defiantly lack the mechanical capability to move large numbers of guns. Plus the logistic support to provide a steady stream of rounds to replace those used, IOTL the Japanese were effectively out of ammunition for their artillery by the time they reached Singapore. And I would expect that ITTL, they are going to run out of ammunition much sooner, unless they seriously ration the daily amount of ammunition their guns can use. As for some units being equipped with 3-inch mortars instead of the guns that the Table of Organisation lays down for them. A weapon is better than no weapon, and in the jungles of Malaya, the 3-inch mortar along with its ammunition, being capable of being manpacked, means that it can be deployed in areas that no artillery peace can. And for Japanese troops who I have said before, have not experienced being subjected to intense continuous artillery/mortar fire, this is going to be a whole new experience. Used to if not in the front line or line of sight of Chinese artillery, being able to go about their business without having to think about being subjected to intense artillery/mortar attack. Having to take into consideration the fact that they can be without warning subjected to an intense artillery/mortar barrage, is going to require a completely new method of working. I wonder just how good the Japanese light discipline is, British units will not make a light or fire that can be seen after dark, will the Japanese do the same, or have they been corrupted by working in China for so long?
RR.
RR.
Competently manned, supplied, and directed artillery will play merry havoc with exposed infantry. Gen. Nara cited defensive fire by US artillery as the decisive factor in the defeat of 65th Infantry Brigade’s attack at Abucay. Not just defensive concentrations that broke up attacks, but the effects of interdiction fires on movement and communications.
Included on the Pensacola convoy enroute to SE Asia is a U.S. Army Artillery Brigade of 3 Battalions of truck towed field artillery, 75mm Pack How. each battalion had 2x 8 gun batteries, and ammunition also included are 54 USAAF A-24 ( USAAF version of the SBD-3) also 24 USAAF P-40 D ( 2x .50cal MG per wing) Most of the ground crews and group staff were already in the Philippines, having been on the Boise Convoy. Also included as a return to the British were 20 surplus "British 75mm) AKA in British service as the 13lbr. with trucks and ammunition.
The convoy was not combat loaded.
The convoy was due to arrive in Manila by Christmas 1941.
The convoy was not combat loaded.
The convoy was due to arrive in Manila by Christmas 1941.
“The great thing about artillery is… the enemy don’t know it’s comin’. One minute he’s eatin’, smokin’, screwin’ around. The next minute he’s gettin’ BOM-BAH-DED.” Platoon FO, US Army.
No matter how well prepared Malaya is ITTL, or how well Hart is postured to react, the Philippines were beyond the help provided by the Pensacola convoy by the morning of the 8th even though USAFFE didn’t realize it yet. Whether the convoy get pushed to Australia and the forces get sent to the DEI as historically happened or they get reallocated elsewhere would be interesting.
Sending two and some change batteries of guns into Malaya would help equip some of the trained but unequipped artillery units. The FA brigade may still end up getting poured Into the DEI, or they may be more effective if the momentum of the centrifugal offensive is lessened in Malaya. Maybe with more time the P-40s and A-24s could help stiffen the DEI or Malayan defenses, especially over seaports and airfields. If I recall the A-24s arrived without gun solenoids and other key equipment, but were thrown into the fight and suffered accordingly. Maybe with a less frantic atmosphere there will be time to ensure men and machines are brought to combat readiness.
No matter how well prepared Malaya is ITTL, or how well Hart is postured to react, the Philippines were beyond the help provided by the Pensacola convoy by the morning of the 8th even though USAFFE didn’t realize it yet. Whether the convoy get pushed to Australia and the forces get sent to the DEI as historically happened or they get reallocated elsewhere would be interesting.
Sending two and some change batteries of guns into Malaya would help equip some of the trained but unequipped artillery units. The FA brigade may still end up getting poured Into the DEI, or they may be more effective if the momentum of the centrifugal offensive is lessened in Malaya. Maybe with more time the P-40s and A-24s could help stiffen the DEI or Malayan defenses, especially over seaports and airfields. If I recall the A-24s arrived without gun solenoids and other key equipment, but were thrown into the fight and suffered accordingly. Maybe with a less frantic atmosphere there will be time to ensure men and machines are brought to combat readiness.
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Any chance that vehicles equipped with the Wireless Set No. 11 and Signal Corp personnel are planned to arrive at Malaya?
I don't know the period for a workup between RAA and RSC, or their desire to interact together. It just seems wise to have
wireless comms when artillery fire inevitably chews up the land lines. That seems to happen IOTL at Slim River.
Martin Stanton‘s 1996 Armor Magazine article on Slim River also mentions that 11th Indian had lost a large amount of its communications gear during the retreat from Jitra to Slim River, lacking wire laying equipment and supplies of wire. This shortage also limited the ability to network and pre-register the guns for effective defensive fires.
Another factor Stanton identifies is the British failure to identify and subsequently deny the numerous abandoned roads and secondary trails through the plantations. Despite sometimes being one tank wide they’re a good example of the kind of mounted avenues of approach the TTL British will need to learn to identify and exploit. You can move a modern Soviet style Reinforced Motor Rifle Company down a set of similar trails in platoon serials pulled by recon bikes or scout cars before modern troops with their own vehicles and radios can stop them from penetrating to artillery, C2, or aviation units. I can imagine it wouldn’t be much harder in 1942. Especially as the Japanese leaders repeatedly demonstrated that they were willing to accept risk by leading with tanks rather than infantry to gain speed at the expense of security in restricted or even severely restricted terrain.
Fatigue comes through repeatedly in primary source accounts of the Battle of Malaya. 11th Indian Division had been in contact for nearly a month while fighting a retrograde operation. The effects of Jitra alone would have been a serious blow to morale, absent the effects of the retreat and destruction of 6th Indian Brigade at Gurun. While Murray-Lyon suffered relief for his handling of the division, Malaya Command also failed to rotate units forward to relieve them to let them get a breather. Rather, it seems 12th Brigade was only moved forward once 11th division had started to come apart during the retreat from Jitra. At the point that the 11th Division reached Slim River, it’s debatable that they were in a fit condition to establish a defense much less fight a battle without rest and at least limited refit.
Another factor Stanton identifies is the British failure to identify and subsequently deny the numerous abandoned roads and secondary trails through the plantations. Despite sometimes being one tank wide they’re a good example of the kind of mounted avenues of approach the TTL British will need to learn to identify and exploit. You can move a modern Soviet style Reinforced Motor Rifle Company down a set of similar trails in platoon serials pulled by recon bikes or scout cars before modern troops with their own vehicles and radios can stop them from penetrating to artillery, C2, or aviation units. I can imagine it wouldn’t be much harder in 1942. Especially as the Japanese leaders repeatedly demonstrated that they were willing to accept risk by leading with tanks rather than infantry to gain speed at the expense of security in restricted or even severely restricted terrain.
Fatigue comes through repeatedly in primary source accounts of the Battle of Malaya. 11th Indian Division had been in contact for nearly a month while fighting a retrograde operation. The effects of Jitra alone would have been a serious blow to morale, absent the effects of the retreat and destruction of 6th Indian Brigade at Gurun. While Murray-Lyon suffered relief for his handling of the division, Malaya Command also failed to rotate units forward to relieve them to let them get a breather. Rather, it seems 12th Brigade was only moved forward once 11th division had started to come apart during the retreat from Jitra. At the point that the 11th Division reached Slim River, it’s debatable that they were in a fit condition to establish a defense much less fight a battle without rest and at least limited refit.
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Is an analogy to an egg suitable? Break the shell and the egg (defense) crumbles? The Malayan defense/defence is still coalescing. If there were a NTC to cycle every battalion
through over time does the outcome change? Would it still require several visits to gain proficiency and instill confidence?
Lord Gort did experience in NW Europe the speed of Modern War and its complexity. Lord Gort is attempting to avoid relearning lessons in German that will soon be presented in Japanese. Although some aspects of C2 are addressed in the Author's writings. I'm sensing that he is expanding it to the C3ISR concept.
The Japanese are aware of the fatigue issues. They have been fighting for multiple years now. The war in North Arica has gone back and forth for a while. Perhaps some of the
experience of knowing it's a long slog helps. No amount of practice actually prepares you to begin butchering people. Some people never can. Some people can do it once. Some people are socio/psychopaths. Some people can treat it as their job. Some people learn to improve at it. I'm sure that I'm missing some characterizations.
Driftless
Donor
This BBC train trek article just popped up this morning on my FB feed:
Malayan jungle train journey
It's a very short read, but kind of appropos
Malayan jungle train journey
It's a very short read, but kind of appropos
MWI 41111211 Hard Work Bears Fruit
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Wednesday 12 November;
Park sat in the Filter Room at Glugor, along with Air Commodore Wann, watching the training plan play out. As of today, all Wann’s bomber squadrons were declared operational, although more training would be welcomed. Four Battles flying south from Alor Star had been picked up by the recently operational AMES 244 TRU up on Kedah Peak, and reported in. Thanks to a pre-existing trail up Kedah Peak, which the Army had widened into a narrow road to allow access to the top for its Observation Posts, overlooking the Gurun defensive line, Park had been able to site 244 TRU up there. They had connected into the newly laid telephone lines laid by the Army, and had a functioning radar net, while the work on the Penang radar site above Georgetown continued.
Two Hurricanes of RCAF 416 Fighter Sqn from Bayan Lepas had taken off to intercept. Previously, using the COL radar at Bukit Huma, northern end of Penang, although they were flying higher than Kedah Peak, the radar plot would have been distorted by the mountain’s refection, and contact with the Battles would have been lost for a while. However, now they were plotted all the way, and according to the plan the Battles were met by the two Hurricanes seaward, around Kedah Peak, and intercepted successfully.
The work on building the facilities for a radar station on Western Hill, Penang, was proving to be very difficult, and was reliant on using the funicular railway, or a pack mule train, and then creating a jeep track to the site. The site itself, gave an almost 360-degree vision, although Kedah Peak partly masked the north-east. They planned a fixed telephone line down to the Filter station at Glugor, which also had connections with Bayan Lepas, Butterworth, Sungai Petani, Alor Star and Kuala Ketil airfields. The completion date had been moved backward three times now, Park was still unsure of when he would have the station finished. The COL site on the south of the island, on Batu Maung was also proving difficult to complete, but both sites wouldn’t be receiving their radar units until sometime in the new year.
Further news was the airfields at Butterworth and Kuala Ketil had become operational in mid-October, and Wann took the opportunity to rebase his forces. The arrival of HMCS Prince David in mid-October had carried enough aircrew, to enable both RCAF 406, and its spawn, 416 to be at full complement, and they had been at pains to ensure there was a balance of experienced pilots between the two. With this completed, he’d made both squadrons operational, but was well aware they both needed a lot more training. He’d based RCAF 416 Sqn at Bayan Lepas, on Penang, with RCAF 406 Sqn basing at Kuala Ketil, the new airfield east of Sungai Petani, which, although it had a decent grass runway, all its other facilities were still very basic, and they’d be living in tents. Both were part of RAF 151 Wing, with RAF 81 Sqn, moving to Alor Star.
The Battles Wing, 7 RCAF, was somewhat scattered, with both RAF 226 and RCAF 404 at Sungai Petani, and RCAF 414 at Ipoh, while his Blenheim Wing, 44 RAF, had both RAF 34 and 62 Sqns at Butterworth and RCAF 407 and RAAF 454, both at Taiping. It had been planned that RAF 60 Sqn, currently in Burma, was to transfer to Malaya to undergo live ammunition target practice, but with the developing situation, this was cancelled and they would get some target practice when a new range in Burma was constructed in the new year. With all these aircraft in the north, he’d felt it appropriate to form a third section of the RAF 81 Repair & Salvage Unit, which he had based at Butterworth.
Air Commodore Vincent, RAF 224 Group (Singapore), had taken over responsibility for the air defence of Eastern Malaya, and RAAF 457 Sqn was now based at Kota Bharu and Gong Kedah, to provide a fighter aircraft presence. RNZAF 486 had been temporarily moved to Kuantan, RAF 134 backfilling from Batu Pahat, while the recently formed FAA 895 Sqn, with its carrier enabled Brewster Buffalos was also taking on Singapore Air Defence duties, from its base at Sembawang.
The other thing Park had been pushing hard on, was fighter tactics. A war with Japan was looking increasingly likely, and Park was concerned about his force’s ability to continue to operate due to attrition. Painfully aware of how daily combat could quickly reduce a force, and realisation that reinforcements would be slow to come, Park was keen to preserve what he had. Although he had an expanding air force, the majority of his pilots were extremely raw, lacking experience, and he’d seen how easily combat in the ‘Battle of Britain’ had eaten them up.
Air Commodore Vincent had set up a small working group, of experienced BoB vets, to look at this and had identified a number of points.
1. Timely use of advanced radar warning would give the fighters time to gain the height and positional advantage.
2. Operating in finger four formations made it easier for new pilots to remain in formation.
3. Both old and new Japanese fighters although slower, were more agile, the newer model frighteningly so, if intelligence reports were to be believed.
4. Adoption of the swop and climb tactic, much like the Germans had used in the BoB, and continue the British tactic of concentrating on the bombers.
By adopting these tactics, Park hoped for his pilots to be as effective as possible, while at the same time limiting their losses.
Supporting this force was a ground organisation that was improving all the time on its aircraft recovery and repair, but Park knew he had to do more on the rescue of pilots parachuting out of their aircraft. He was working with the Army on special teams that could be sent out into the jungle to help search for them, while over the sea, he was working with the Navy on identifying small ships, and where they might be based, to conduct rescue missions. All of this, however, was still at a very embryonic stage.
Another problem that was being addressed was the ground to air coverage that the TR 90D high frequency radio telephone sets fitted in his aircraft gave. These only had a maximum range of 40 miles, in Britain, the problem had been overcome by the use of mobile radio tenders, lorries fitted with additional radio sets, parked up and connected to a telephone line, which were in direct contact with the ground controller, who repeated his instructions. However, the RAF in Britain had been converting over to VHF sets, and a number of the old redundant radio tenders had been dismantled, the radio equipment, minus the vehicles, being shipped out. His RIMU (Radio Installation & Maintenance Unit) based at Ponggol, Singapore, although primarily a radar maintenance unit, had begun installing some of that equipment into freshly arrived Canadian built trucks, converting one a week, the first one was now installed at Mersing, helping provide extended radio control coverage over some of the eastern side of Johore.
Park sat in the Filter Room at Glugor, along with Air Commodore Wann, watching the training plan play out. As of today, all Wann’s bomber squadrons were declared operational, although more training would be welcomed. Four Battles flying south from Alor Star had been picked up by the recently operational AMES 244 TRU up on Kedah Peak, and reported in. Thanks to a pre-existing trail up Kedah Peak, which the Army had widened into a narrow road to allow access to the top for its Observation Posts, overlooking the Gurun defensive line, Park had been able to site 244 TRU up there. They had connected into the newly laid telephone lines laid by the Army, and had a functioning radar net, while the work on the Penang radar site above Georgetown continued.
Two Hurricanes of RCAF 416 Fighter Sqn from Bayan Lepas had taken off to intercept. Previously, using the COL radar at Bukit Huma, northern end of Penang, although they were flying higher than Kedah Peak, the radar plot would have been distorted by the mountain’s refection, and contact with the Battles would have been lost for a while. However, now they were plotted all the way, and according to the plan the Battles were met by the two Hurricanes seaward, around Kedah Peak, and intercepted successfully.
The work on building the facilities for a radar station on Western Hill, Penang, was proving to be very difficult, and was reliant on using the funicular railway, or a pack mule train, and then creating a jeep track to the site. The site itself, gave an almost 360-degree vision, although Kedah Peak partly masked the north-east. They planned a fixed telephone line down to the Filter station at Glugor, which also had connections with Bayan Lepas, Butterworth, Sungai Petani, Alor Star and Kuala Ketil airfields. The completion date had been moved backward three times now, Park was still unsure of when he would have the station finished. The COL site on the south of the island, on Batu Maung was also proving difficult to complete, but both sites wouldn’t be receiving their radar units until sometime in the new year.
Further news was the airfields at Butterworth and Kuala Ketil had become operational in mid-October, and Wann took the opportunity to rebase his forces. The arrival of HMCS Prince David in mid-October had carried enough aircrew, to enable both RCAF 406, and its spawn, 416 to be at full complement, and they had been at pains to ensure there was a balance of experienced pilots between the two. With this completed, he’d made both squadrons operational, but was well aware they both needed a lot more training. He’d based RCAF 416 Sqn at Bayan Lepas, on Penang, with RCAF 406 Sqn basing at Kuala Ketil, the new airfield east of Sungai Petani, which, although it had a decent grass runway, all its other facilities were still very basic, and they’d be living in tents. Both were part of RAF 151 Wing, with RAF 81 Sqn, moving to Alor Star.
The Battles Wing, 7 RCAF, was somewhat scattered, with both RAF 226 and RCAF 404 at Sungai Petani, and RCAF 414 at Ipoh, while his Blenheim Wing, 44 RAF, had both RAF 34 and 62 Sqns at Butterworth and RCAF 407 and RAAF 454, both at Taiping. It had been planned that RAF 60 Sqn, currently in Burma, was to transfer to Malaya to undergo live ammunition target practice, but with the developing situation, this was cancelled and they would get some target practice when a new range in Burma was constructed in the new year. With all these aircraft in the north, he’d felt it appropriate to form a third section of the RAF 81 Repair & Salvage Unit, which he had based at Butterworth.
Air Commodore Vincent, RAF 224 Group (Singapore), had taken over responsibility for the air defence of Eastern Malaya, and RAAF 457 Sqn was now based at Kota Bharu and Gong Kedah, to provide a fighter aircraft presence. RNZAF 486 had been temporarily moved to Kuantan, RAF 134 backfilling from Batu Pahat, while the recently formed FAA 895 Sqn, with its carrier enabled Brewster Buffalos was also taking on Singapore Air Defence duties, from its base at Sembawang.
The other thing Park had been pushing hard on, was fighter tactics. A war with Japan was looking increasingly likely, and Park was concerned about his force’s ability to continue to operate due to attrition. Painfully aware of how daily combat could quickly reduce a force, and realisation that reinforcements would be slow to come, Park was keen to preserve what he had. Although he had an expanding air force, the majority of his pilots were extremely raw, lacking experience, and he’d seen how easily combat in the ‘Battle of Britain’ had eaten them up.
Air Commodore Vincent had set up a small working group, of experienced BoB vets, to look at this and had identified a number of points.
1. Timely use of advanced radar warning would give the fighters time to gain the height and positional advantage.
2. Operating in finger four formations made it easier for new pilots to remain in formation.
3. Both old and new Japanese fighters although slower, were more agile, the newer model frighteningly so, if intelligence reports were to be believed.
4. Adoption of the swop and climb tactic, much like the Germans had used in the BoB, and continue the British tactic of concentrating on the bombers.
By adopting these tactics, Park hoped for his pilots to be as effective as possible, while at the same time limiting their losses.
Supporting this force was a ground organisation that was improving all the time on its aircraft recovery and repair, but Park knew he had to do more on the rescue of pilots parachuting out of their aircraft. He was working with the Army on special teams that could be sent out into the jungle to help search for them, while over the sea, he was working with the Navy on identifying small ships, and where they might be based, to conduct rescue missions. All of this, however, was still at a very embryonic stage.
Another problem that was being addressed was the ground to air coverage that the TR 90D high frequency radio telephone sets fitted in his aircraft gave. These only had a maximum range of 40 miles, in Britain, the problem had been overcome by the use of mobile radio tenders, lorries fitted with additional radio sets, parked up and connected to a telephone line, which were in direct contact with the ground controller, who repeated his instructions. However, the RAF in Britain had been converting over to VHF sets, and a number of the old redundant radio tenders had been dismantled, the radio equipment, minus the vehicles, being shipped out. His RIMU (Radio Installation & Maintenance Unit) based at Ponggol, Singapore, although primarily a radar maintenance unit, had begun installing some of that equipment into freshly arrived Canadian built trucks, converting one a week, the first one was now installed at Mersing, helping provide extended radio control coverage over some of the eastern side of Johore.