Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
MWI 41012415 Stewart Makes His Point
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Friday 24 January;
It had started as just a routine display, an exercise to show off the Singapore Garrison’s competency. Major General Keith Simmons, the garrison’s commander, had planned it, using his two British battalions, the 2 Bn Loyal Regt (North Lancashire) and the 2 Bn Gordon Highlanders, for the exercise. To play the role of the ‘enemy’, he had borrowed the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders from the 12th Indian Brigade, ostensibly so as not to vilify his own Indian battalions, but he was keen to promote his force over the ‘fire brigade’ of Malaya, as the 12th Indian was Malaya Command’s only reserve. The 12th brigade had arrived in Malaya back in late 1939, and had an air of independence, a suggestion they were better than the rest. And secondly, their commander was a bit of an odd ball, who insisted on taking his men in pointless treks thought the jungle.
It was only a day’s demonstration, designed to show how easily Simmons battalions could relieve each other, in defence, in depth along a major road, show casing their mobility and adaptability. It was a nice little exercise, a day’s outing for the ‘Generals’ he had invited, Lord Gort and Lt Gen Percival. Lt Col Ian Stewart, commander of the ‘enemy’ was given a simple brief, to advance down the road, and capture the HQ at the end of the road. But somehow things didn’t go according to plan, firstly Simmons choice of umpires was changed by Percival, who wanted to blood some British Indian Army officers, with a view of them conducting similar exercises in Northern Malaya. And secondly, Stewart of the Argylls didn’t read the script.
Everyone knew there was a fierce rivalry between the battalions of Argylls and the Gordons, that went without saying, and Lt Col Richard Gilbert Lees of the Gordons was keen to show he could deal with Stewart and his men well before the Loyal Regiment got involved. And so, he laid a trap, his initial defence across the road would withdraw back to the rest of the battalion, leaving a company deployed either side of the road, creating a horseshoe, enticing the Argylls into a trap which even if it didn’t destroy the entire battalion, it would be ruled that the Argylls offensive power was destroyed, and so ‘win’ the exercise.
It probably looked good on paper, but the Gordons had never trained in jungle, and so both flanking companies were only about 100 yards off the road. The Argylls advance down the road, but with flanking platoons about 400 yards deep in the jungle and quickly the edges of both flanking companies were being ‘rolled up’ as the judges ruled. The progress of the Argylls was slow though and so many Gordons were able to scramble back onto the road and retreat back to battalion, admittedly with heavy casualties as the Argylls had deployed a couple of Vickers machine guns sighted down the road.
But what the Gordon’s didn’t appreciate was the Argyll advance was deliberately slow, so as to allow a flanking move by a Company, time to complete a hook around them all, and construct an ambush between the Gordons and Loyals on the road. It was only when the Umpire attached to that company stepped out onto the road and began declaring rear echelon units as ‘dead’ that Lees recognised what had happened. He rushed his men back, and together with a Company of the Loyals coming forward, cleared the ambush, but the Umpires were having a field day, over half the Gordons either dead or captured, including Lees himself.
Lt Col Mordaunt Elrington, CO of the Loyals was a lot more cautious, determined not to allow gaps to appear between his companies, and as soon as a flanking move materialised, he pushed a company forward to deal with it. But the jungle is a great place for concealment, and if he had known those flanking moves were by platoons and not companies maybe he would have committed so many of his men forward as he did. His last company and battalion HQ were attacked by yet another flanking attack, again only a platoon, and turning to face them, was hit hard by a company attack from the opposite flank, something the Umpires ruled as devastating, causing the battalion to fall back on its on forward troops. Elrington organised a counter attack to reopen the road back, but the Argyll company dug in and resisted all attempts to move it.
Now, with the time of the day’s exercise nearly over, Stewart used his last platoon to push up the road, encountering a road block by some of the surviving Gordons, and while they were engaged, he again flanked the Gordons, this time with all that he had left, his own battalion HQ and accompanying extras, the attached cooks, mechanics etc, all having marched through jungle to make this movement. They came out by Simmons HQ, Stewart insisting his cooks don their chef white’s, the mechanics in overalls, but all with back packs and rifles with bayonets attached. The British Indian Umpires ruled it a complete success, HQ captured and two battalions destroyed or captured.
Simmons went apoplectic, insisting Stewart had cheated, the men must have been hidden before the exercise, no cook or mechanic could possibly do that, the area of the exercise only extended to 100 yards either side of the road, that was a given, the Umpires were biased, and how dare he, Stewart, try to embarrass him in front of Gort and Percival, demanding that Stewart be court martialled, demoted, even shot!
Percival, in his calm underwhelming way, agreed with Simmons, ruling the exercise void, the defenders would have held the road, and that he would deal with Stewart. Gort was mortified to see such a senior figure, and a companion of numerous dinner parties so embarrassed, and formed a very bad opinion of Stewart. Percival told Stewart he would see him on the Monday, and discuss what had taken place, but privately Percival agreed with the Umpires and was mightily concerned that two of what he had considered up to now as his best battalions, were so well beaten.
It had started as just a routine display, an exercise to show off the Singapore Garrison’s competency. Major General Keith Simmons, the garrison’s commander, had planned it, using his two British battalions, the 2 Bn Loyal Regt (North Lancashire) and the 2 Bn Gordon Highlanders, for the exercise. To play the role of the ‘enemy’, he had borrowed the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders from the 12th Indian Brigade, ostensibly so as not to vilify his own Indian battalions, but he was keen to promote his force over the ‘fire brigade’ of Malaya, as the 12th Indian was Malaya Command’s only reserve. The 12th brigade had arrived in Malaya back in late 1939, and had an air of independence, a suggestion they were better than the rest. And secondly, their commander was a bit of an odd ball, who insisted on taking his men in pointless treks thought the jungle.
It was only a day’s demonstration, designed to show how easily Simmons battalions could relieve each other, in defence, in depth along a major road, show casing their mobility and adaptability. It was a nice little exercise, a day’s outing for the ‘Generals’ he had invited, Lord Gort and Lt Gen Percival. Lt Col Ian Stewart, commander of the ‘enemy’ was given a simple brief, to advance down the road, and capture the HQ at the end of the road. But somehow things didn’t go according to plan, firstly Simmons choice of umpires was changed by Percival, who wanted to blood some British Indian Army officers, with a view of them conducting similar exercises in Northern Malaya. And secondly, Stewart of the Argylls didn’t read the script.
Everyone knew there was a fierce rivalry between the battalions of Argylls and the Gordons, that went without saying, and Lt Col Richard Gilbert Lees of the Gordons was keen to show he could deal with Stewart and his men well before the Loyal Regiment got involved. And so, he laid a trap, his initial defence across the road would withdraw back to the rest of the battalion, leaving a company deployed either side of the road, creating a horseshoe, enticing the Argylls into a trap which even if it didn’t destroy the entire battalion, it would be ruled that the Argylls offensive power was destroyed, and so ‘win’ the exercise.
It probably looked good on paper, but the Gordons had never trained in jungle, and so both flanking companies were only about 100 yards off the road. The Argylls advance down the road, but with flanking platoons about 400 yards deep in the jungle and quickly the edges of both flanking companies were being ‘rolled up’ as the judges ruled. The progress of the Argylls was slow though and so many Gordons were able to scramble back onto the road and retreat back to battalion, admittedly with heavy casualties as the Argylls had deployed a couple of Vickers machine guns sighted down the road.
But what the Gordon’s didn’t appreciate was the Argyll advance was deliberately slow, so as to allow a flanking move by a Company, time to complete a hook around them all, and construct an ambush between the Gordons and Loyals on the road. It was only when the Umpire attached to that company stepped out onto the road and began declaring rear echelon units as ‘dead’ that Lees recognised what had happened. He rushed his men back, and together with a Company of the Loyals coming forward, cleared the ambush, but the Umpires were having a field day, over half the Gordons either dead or captured, including Lees himself.
Lt Col Mordaunt Elrington, CO of the Loyals was a lot more cautious, determined not to allow gaps to appear between his companies, and as soon as a flanking move materialised, he pushed a company forward to deal with it. But the jungle is a great place for concealment, and if he had known those flanking moves were by platoons and not companies maybe he would have committed so many of his men forward as he did. His last company and battalion HQ were attacked by yet another flanking attack, again only a platoon, and turning to face them, was hit hard by a company attack from the opposite flank, something the Umpires ruled as devastating, causing the battalion to fall back on its on forward troops. Elrington organised a counter attack to reopen the road back, but the Argyll company dug in and resisted all attempts to move it.
Now, with the time of the day’s exercise nearly over, Stewart used his last platoon to push up the road, encountering a road block by some of the surviving Gordons, and while they were engaged, he again flanked the Gordons, this time with all that he had left, his own battalion HQ and accompanying extras, the attached cooks, mechanics etc, all having marched through jungle to make this movement. They came out by Simmons HQ, Stewart insisting his cooks don their chef white’s, the mechanics in overalls, but all with back packs and rifles with bayonets attached. The British Indian Umpires ruled it a complete success, HQ captured and two battalions destroyed or captured.
Simmons went apoplectic, insisting Stewart had cheated, the men must have been hidden before the exercise, no cook or mechanic could possibly do that, the area of the exercise only extended to 100 yards either side of the road, that was a given, the Umpires were biased, and how dare he, Stewart, try to embarrass him in front of Gort and Percival, demanding that Stewart be court martialled, demoted, even shot!
Percival, in his calm underwhelming way, agreed with Simmons, ruling the exercise void, the defenders would have held the road, and that he would deal with Stewart. Gort was mortified to see such a senior figure, and a companion of numerous dinner parties so embarrassed, and formed a very bad opinion of Stewart. Percival told Stewart he would see him on the Monday, and discuss what had taken place, but privately Percival agreed with the Umpires and was mightily concerned that two of what he had considered up to now as his best battalions, were so well beaten.
Interesting... Percival, if only privately, has grasped what happened, while Gort is distracted by social-status issues. One hopes that Gort will get his head clear, and that Percival will manage to apply what he learned.
I agree that it is important that the British realized that their assumptions are wrong. Hopefully they will adapt to the reality on the ground.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
How spooky you should mention Ugaki, His name cropped while I was pursuing another small interest in the IJN.
Now I should state here and now, I have no expertise on American operations whatsoever, I'm just a journeyman history buff when it comes to them. So Ugaki was quite new to me, and maybe to many of the rest of you. So to bring everyone else up to speed on what I know, here goes.
Matome Ugaki was Yamamoto's chief of staff, who was in the second G4M, which was shot down over Bougainville, Solomon Islands in 1943, when Yamamoto was killed. He later commanded at battleship division at 'The Battle of the Philippine Sea, and at Leyte Gulf, and on hearing that Japan was going to surrender, got himself on a Kamikaze mission. However, he also kept an extensive and revealing war diary, to quote Wikipedia. Given we are so short of good Japanese WW2 source material due to most Japanese cities being fire bombed, along with a couple having a nuclear bomb dropped on them, few records survived, so his diaries provide very useful insight, or so I'm told. I've only just stumbled on him, following down the reasons why only the Kitakami and Oi light cruisers were modified to take 10 quadruple mount torpedo launchers for the Japanese 'Long Lance' torpedo.
So, if anyone know more about Ugaki, please enlighten us uninformed.
So on 1st May 1942, when the IJN are wargaming the Midway op (as Coral Sea was unfolding), the "Red" i.e. American commander decides to get all aggressive and... moves his carriers to the northeast of the island, not a million miles away from the actual "Point Luck" that Fletcher and Spruance used.
Ugaki is chief judge and says that's not allowed. Because... well, because Americans - despite, you know, Doolittle managing to bomb Japan - don't go for bold offensive moves.
The Red force guy is in tears here. But he soldiers on - well, sailors on, I guess - and later launches a carrier strike against Kido Butai. The dice fall.. and for the IJN team, they fall... poorly.
The American strike was judged to have sunk, um Akagi and Kaga, if I remember correctly (both Symonds The Battle of Midway and Parshall/Tully in Shattered Sword have detail) but Ugaki made a judge's call that really the damage wouldn't be that bad because, well, Yamato Damashii I guess, and anyway the dastardly Yankees would never be so brave as to do something that daring and courageous because they lacked fighting spirit.
Yamamoto was a little perturbed by some of the exercise and did question what would happen if an American carrier force were detected in an unexpected position, but Genda Minoru, architect of IJN carrier ops doctrine, says "we'll give them a backhand across the face so hard their kids are gonna need dentures". Actually it's a lot more pithy in Japanese, but when your ops guy doesn't have an actual answer but basically says "Carrier Striking Force - OOH RAH!" it turns out that everybody in the room decided that it wasn't going to be them who was accused of defeatism and kept their heads below the parapet.
I have a copy of his diaries as edited by Gordon Prange that I bought with a prize I got from my college for Collections results. So my copy still has the letter of congratulation from Sir Roger Bannister as master of the college in it too! Happy to have a root around in it if you have any specific questions - been awhile since I read it
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Thank you for that, I'd heard a little bit about the Japanese bending a war game to suit but not in that detail
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Lucky Boy!, any specific questions?, blimey where would I start.
I'd love to know of any opinions he held about Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo and his Southern Force in December 1941, and of the demotion of Kondo after losing the battleship Kirishima in late 1942. And does he offer any opinions of Admiral Ozawa?
Will have a look and come back to you
On first spin through he certainly doesn't have much time for Nagumo of whom he speaks 'that man not only has words for others but is given to bluffing when drunk. He is not fully prepared yet to advance in the face of death and gain results two or three times as great as his cost by jumping into the jaws of death with his men as well as himself. One could see this clearly when in his blank dismay he was not able to speak a word at the time of the outbreak of the China incident, in spite of his important post of chief of 2nd section naval general staff.'
He goes on to suggest that if Nagumo and Kusaka dont have the stomach for the Pearl Harbour operation they should resign and says that he told Yamamoto so. More cryptically in the same entry of 22nd OCtober 41 he says 'With Vice Admiral Ozawa just sent to be commander in chief of the Southern Fleet, it can be said that the matter came to a happy end because the navy had no other candidate to replace Nagumo'
I presume this refers to Nagumo having committed to Pearl Harbour and therefore that Ugaki regarded Ozawa as the only other viable commander for the attack.
On 29th October 1941 he again references Nagumo appearing very anxious about his mission and goes on to suggest that he would not be worried at all but quite happy to face death etc
Will go digging some more
There may be selective quoting going on, but Ugaki really is coming across as the stereotypical Banzai-brained Imperial Japanese officer.
Getting back to the TL, the British have just had a sharp lesson in what can happen to a road-bound static defence that views the jungle as an impassable obstacle when faced with a mobile opponent employing infiltration tactics. Whether they learn the lesson is yet to be seen, but the divisions in the high command do not bode well.
OTL the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders have a name as one of the few jungle-trained units the British had, but in the campaign they were one of the battalions devastated by Shimada's tanks at Slim River. I note that the exercise did not feature tanks (do the British even have any?) or air support.
Getting back to the TL, the British have just had a sharp lesson in what can happen to a road-bound static defence that views the jungle as an impassable obstacle when faced with a mobile opponent employing infiltration tactics. Whether they learn the lesson is yet to be seen, but the divisions in the high command do not bode well.
OTL the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders have a name as one of the few jungle-trained units the British had, but in the campaign they were one of the battalions devastated by Shimada's tanks at Slim River. I note that the exercise did not feature tanks (do the British even have any?) or air support.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Historically the 12th Indian Brigade was, in my opinion, on par with the Australians, and may have been even better. They had been fighting for the best part of a month, mostly as the rear-guard of the retreating III Indian Corps. Owing to the failure in command of 11th Indian Division, Murray-Lyon had been replaced by the CO of 12th Brigade, by Brig Paris, with the CO of the Argylls, Lt Col Stewart stepped into Paris's shoes. A very tired Stewart, new to commanding a Bde, made mistakes in deployments and was badly punished by the Japanese. In fairness to Stewart, at that time, the British Indian forces were in desperate need of time to rest and regroup, but Yamashita kept the pressure on, and they cracked!
Currently (January 1941) neither historically or in my timeline, there are no British tanks or talk of any being sent. And air cover in both timelines is pretty much non existent.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
I don't know quite when they were given their posts, but historically Kondo led the Southern Force, including the battlecruisers of the IJN distant support force, while Ozawa led the IJN close cover force for the Malaya invasion transports and escorts .
Nagumo has overall responsibility for the ship borne invasion forces of Malaya and Philippines, so I think it would be understandable that he was anxious.
MWI 41012712 Just A War Game
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Monday 27 January
They played a war game, as you or I might, with counters, coloured to indicate nationality or service, placed over a large map, time based, with outcomes. But it was more than just a war game as we would play it, no room for sentiment, looking after one’s favourite pieces, or any form of cheating, no option to say, I misunderstood, or can I take that go again, and no spectacular ending. It took several days to play out, with a number of officers allocated different roles, each enacting orders based on his own units’ capabilities.
Umpires governed the game, rechecking distances, times given to complete a move, and providing outcomes, based on numerous tables of figures. Players played without seeing the opponents’ counters, until contact, and then only partially revealed, creating that famous fog of war. Indeed, players on the same side sat in different rooms, providing written orders by messenger, or by telephone to a switchboard, for their order to be written down and passed along. And umpires played with their orders, delaying many, even losing one or two, again creating the fog of war.
Logistics was at the heart of the game, always questions over fuel supplies, sortie rates for aircraft, ammunition resupply, shipping requirements to transport supplies. Attrition rates were applied, weather conditions factored in, how quickly new airfields might be created, it all was added and noted. In parts, the game broke down into options, each explored for outcomes, what was favourable in speed, what in losses.
This wasn’t the first war game most of these officers had partaken in, like all military forces, war games were an essential part of their preparation to undertake the roles they were given in supporting their countries aims and ambitions. But here at the War College, in the Minato suburb of Tokyo, things were somewhat different, Lt Col Tanikawa, a teacher of strategy, who had planned this simulation, and Col Yasuyuki, another lecturer at the college, who led the umpire’s, were in no doubt that this one, exploring how the aviation side of an invasion of Malaya would play out, would lead to more gaming.
Working on the premise that the army would be of four divisions, and that the British would only field a couple of colonial divisions, with about 200 aircraft in support, including a small number of Spitfires, an air force of about 300 aircraft was needed, including about 100 fighters. There were some fundamental requirements, southern French Indo-China had to be occupied, and its airfields used. Secondly, very quickly, southern Thailand, with its airfields, also had to be occupied. They were told not to expect any aircraft carrier support, so without those airfields, there could be no effective air support, and without air support, no invasion.
Establishing these would take about one month, then the plan diverged into two possible paths, the favoured first, supported by a powerful fleet, a major landing around Mersing, the army then driving down into Singapore. However, air support for this option looked problematic, because of the long distances, sortie rates were low, and fighter cover very minimal. A better option was landing in southern Thailand and northern Malaya, securing the port of Songkhla, capturing the airfields in the area, allowing the air force to redeploy, as the army then drove south to Singapore. This provided better sortie rates, and much more fighter cover. However, owing to logistical requirements, they estimated another three months achieving this.
Now the results looked promising, many outcomes favourable, providing optimism, while the failures weren’t catastrophic, and with adjustments to the planning, possibly solvable. To achieve operational surprise, the initial invasion convoy would hug the French Indo-China coast, suggesting it was bound for Bangkok. With the foresight that the British wouldn’t respond to an occupation of Thailand, a surprise landing of north Malaya could be achieved. Loss rates indicated a pilot replacement need of about 80 in the first month of combat, and just over 200 in three months. Some aircraft and engine maintenance could be done, with extra aero engines and spares shipped in, but it was going to have to accept limited maintenance, which might be managed over a short time span.
For the Chief of Army General Staff General Sugiyama, and War Minister General Tojo, it was enough to encourage them to order increasingly more detailed war games for the IJA, while the IJN, was also busy examining her options, and capabilities through games of her own. And so, while not militarily committed to conquest of South East Asia, both services began engaging in increasingly more detailed planning for that option.
They played a war game, as you or I might, with counters, coloured to indicate nationality or service, placed over a large map, time based, with outcomes. But it was more than just a war game as we would play it, no room for sentiment, looking after one’s favourite pieces, or any form of cheating, no option to say, I misunderstood, or can I take that go again, and no spectacular ending. It took several days to play out, with a number of officers allocated different roles, each enacting orders based on his own units’ capabilities.
Umpires governed the game, rechecking distances, times given to complete a move, and providing outcomes, based on numerous tables of figures. Players played without seeing the opponents’ counters, until contact, and then only partially revealed, creating that famous fog of war. Indeed, players on the same side sat in different rooms, providing written orders by messenger, or by telephone to a switchboard, for their order to be written down and passed along. And umpires played with their orders, delaying many, even losing one or two, again creating the fog of war.
Logistics was at the heart of the game, always questions over fuel supplies, sortie rates for aircraft, ammunition resupply, shipping requirements to transport supplies. Attrition rates were applied, weather conditions factored in, how quickly new airfields might be created, it all was added and noted. In parts, the game broke down into options, each explored for outcomes, what was favourable in speed, what in losses.
This wasn’t the first war game most of these officers had partaken in, like all military forces, war games were an essential part of their preparation to undertake the roles they were given in supporting their countries aims and ambitions. But here at the War College, in the Minato suburb of Tokyo, things were somewhat different, Lt Col Tanikawa, a teacher of strategy, who had planned this simulation, and Col Yasuyuki, another lecturer at the college, who led the umpire’s, were in no doubt that this one, exploring how the aviation side of an invasion of Malaya would play out, would lead to more gaming.
Working on the premise that the army would be of four divisions, and that the British would only field a couple of colonial divisions, with about 200 aircraft in support, including a small number of Spitfires, an air force of about 300 aircraft was needed, including about 100 fighters. There were some fundamental requirements, southern French Indo-China had to be occupied, and its airfields used. Secondly, very quickly, southern Thailand, with its airfields, also had to be occupied. They were told not to expect any aircraft carrier support, so without those airfields, there could be no effective air support, and without air support, no invasion.
Establishing these would take about one month, then the plan diverged into two possible paths, the favoured first, supported by a powerful fleet, a major landing around Mersing, the army then driving down into Singapore. However, air support for this option looked problematic, because of the long distances, sortie rates were low, and fighter cover very minimal. A better option was landing in southern Thailand and northern Malaya, securing the port of Songkhla, capturing the airfields in the area, allowing the air force to redeploy, as the army then drove south to Singapore. This provided better sortie rates, and much more fighter cover. However, owing to logistical requirements, they estimated another three months achieving this.
Now the results looked promising, many outcomes favourable, providing optimism, while the failures weren’t catastrophic, and with adjustments to the planning, possibly solvable. To achieve operational surprise, the initial invasion convoy would hug the French Indo-China coast, suggesting it was bound for Bangkok. With the foresight that the British wouldn’t respond to an occupation of Thailand, a surprise landing of north Malaya could be achieved. Loss rates indicated a pilot replacement need of about 80 in the first month of combat, and just over 200 in three months. Some aircraft and engine maintenance could be done, with extra aero engines and spares shipped in, but it was going to have to accept limited maintenance, which might be managed over a short time span.
For the Chief of Army General Staff General Sugiyama, and War Minister General Tojo, it was enough to encourage them to order increasingly more detailed war games for the IJA, while the IJN, was also busy examining her options, and capabilities through games of her own. And so, while not militarily committed to conquest of South East Asia, both services began engaging in increasingly more detailed planning for that option.
The amount of knowledge authors such as yourself have absorbed in order to write these fantastic stories is truly mind-blowing. 🍻