CHAPTER LVII
It had become a common occurrence during the last few presidential terms to have multiple crises looming over at the end of a term. Back during President Brătianu’s tenure there was the Egyptian Affair and the Red Uprising that troubled the end of both of his terms, for President Maiorescu there was the Savoy-Aosta Affair and now there was the entire Potemkin situation as well as the refugee crisis on the eastern border. More so, it seemed there was a difficult situation unfolding in Romanian East Africa as well. While the Romanian Colonial Government of the region had managed to secure several key victories over the monarchs of the horn, the three polities still functioned rather autonomously.
The Majerteeni and Warsangali realms were both in a situation of near civil war due to the conflicts between several clans and tribes and their leaders. The two sultans, Gerad Ali and Yusuf Kenadid had died during the late 1890s and early 1900s, and were succeeded by their sons, both of whom were completely unable to command the support of their vassals. There was also the growing threat of the Dervish Movement, a rebel organization that sought to remove Romanian colonial rule from the Horn. The Dervish, a proto-national movement of the Somali, were also opposed to the rule of the Sultans, whom they believed to be corrupt and weak, but they believed the framework of the clans and tribes should be maintained. Furthermore, they generally had the support of influential tribal families on most of the Somali coast and proved rather adept at harassing the Romanian authorities in the Horn through guerilla warfare. Governor Lahovari, troubled by the issue, sought help from Bucharest numerous times, but the Maiorescu Administration was rarely able to answer the calls from the colonies, generally being involved with pressing issues at home.
Nevertheless, the president decided that a visit to the colonies was long overdue but the sultanates on the coast were the least of his concerns – he believed that if the situation would become dire there would be little in the way of the rather sizeable Romanian Colonial Army to crushing the untrained and poorly armed rebels, rather his first priority would be a discussion with Emperor Menelik, the leader of the Ethiopian realm that had grown stronger and more prosperous than ever during the last decade, but whose political elite was still decidedly anti-Romanian. Surely, it would have also been rather insulting to the emperor, who was now also forced to only use the title of monarch, to not be the first to be visited by the president, and Maiorescu was tactful enough to understand that while Ethiopia was firmly in the Romanian colonial sphere, it was still capable enough to mount a strong opposition to Romania’s colonial ambitions if relations soured.
Menelik had achieved a great deal of centralization in his realm, the power of the Ethiopian clans had been reduced significantly due to the strong enforcement of the ban on slavery and this proved a good opportunity for the monarch to strangle the little opposition there was against his rule in its cradle. The political elite that coagulated around him, together with Menelik himself, remained rather cautious of their Romanian overlords. They tried to stop as much as they could the interlinking of Ethiopia’s weak economy with Romania’s large one as well as the continued flow of Romanian colonists in the region. Though a formidable opponent, Menelik was not without weaknesses – he had no male successors and even those most loyal to him in the Ethiopian political circles were very reluctant to support his daughter, Princess Zewditu. Nevertheless, the other option was to allow Romania to assume full colonial control of the region, since it was rather clear that at Menelik’s death if the clans decided to resume a political or otherwise war for power that the Romanians would step in.
But things had not yet reached that point. President Maiorescu sailed to REA just to have his first discussion with the monarch, and Menelik knew he had to keep appearances up. A cunning man, Menelik prepared a large extravagant feast for receiving the president, but he stood high on his throne when Maiorescu entered the room, always looking from above. This was initially perceived as confrontational by the ARI guards that accompanied the president, but Maiorescu gave them the signal to back away.
President Maiorescu had read all the intel on the emperor that was given to him prior and prepared himself for any possible surprise. He knew that Menelik was trying to show that he still had authority and he knew that the monarch would never allow himself to look weak in front of what was, in the eyes of his aristocracy, a commoner. The president bowed shortly in front of Menelik’s throne before speaking in a soft but commanding tone, presenting himself in front of the court. The discussion was less stern however, Menelik, while cunning and strategic in his employment of words, was also a very curious and interested in learning every new little thing. President Maiorescu held the monarch in high regards after their meeting and later wrote in his memoirs, years later after Menelik had died, that “he was as curious as a cat and as cunning as a fox, yet he never gave me the impression that he was ill-natured. In fact, he seemed to only ever work to ensure the best for his nation and for his people, unlike so many of the politicians here, at home”.
Menelik had made good impressions before as well, Governor Lahovari praised him for his friendliness and overall pleasant disposition – “he knows how to keep his men in line, but he’s never arrogant or petty”. The contents of the president’s private discussion with Menelik remained confidential for a long time, but it is widely believed that the monarch tried to negotiate Romanian support for Princess Zewditu after Menelik’s death, although many dispute this fact. President Maiorescu later wrote that “the late Emperor and I only ever discussed the modernization of Ethiopian bureaucracy and the betterment of her government”, which made many believe that Menelik managed to get Maiorescu to agree on Abyssinia breaking away from the REA to become a full Romanian ally in the Horn.
Menelik II, Monarch of Abyssinia (1897
*-1914)
It was the Romanian Orthodox Church, however, that was trying to make its own mark on the colonies. Initially building an organization in the colonies so that it could provide religious assistance to the Romanian colonists arriving in the region, the Church soon became involved in the initial power struggles of Abyssinia. While the Ethiopians were mostly Christian themselves, they adhered to a non-Chalcedonian branch of Christianity and were, institutionally, under the Coptic Church with its seat in Alexandria. The Romanian Church was looking to change that and bring the Ethiopian Church in a full communion with itself, something that was very risky politically. But the Romanian Church did not only start its maneuvering in Abyssinia.
The Coast Sultanates were also infiltrated and Romanian prelates soon began a campaign of conversion of the Somali populace, mainly of Muslim faith. The former slaves were the first targeted demographic for the Church, but other tribes soon followed suit when they were promised more economic opportunities as well as political assistance against the governments of the Sultanates. This only helped raise the tensions between segments of the Somali population, as some members of it grew even more ardently Muslim and opposed to both the REA and the Sultans themselves, while the newly-converted Christians aligned themselves with the Romanian Church and Governorate.
In Abyssinia, Menelik intervened on behalf of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and a three-way agreement was achieved in which REA and the Ethiopian Monarchy would recognize the Romanian Church as an official religious institution in the colonies, but the Romanian Church had to stop its attempts to bring the EOC under its heel. In exchange, it was given the right to build churches and cathedrals in Abyssinia and organize other religious events for its faithful. The Maiorescu Administration remained passive in regards to this but Governor Lahovari was instructed to not allow the situation in the Sultanates to deteriorate into civil war and if push came to shove to use article 5 of the Romanian East Africa Fundamental Act which prescribed that any political structure inside the colonial government or devolved under it would be guaranteed a republican and democratic form of government, an article devised especially for the future takeover of the Horn statelets.
Back at home, Vice President Marghiloman was given a freer schedule in order to be able to conduct his presidential campaign that was now seeing a steep loss of momentum after Speaker Popovici managed to overwhelmingly secure Transylvania. The next two contests, in the West, were also places were Marghiloman was the clear underdog and would require a miracle to win. It was rather clear that Popovici’s strategy of sweeping the early contests of the West gave him a strong lead nationally as well, as his campaign was now more prominent than ever after winning by such a strong margin. Areas where he previously struggled, especially in Wallachia were now warming up to him, even though the Conservative electorate was dwindling even in traditionally Conservative seats such as Middle Wallachia.
As the early September contests ended, Popovici once more emerged the victor, winning both the Western Plains and Crișana/Maramureș, both with over 60% of the vote. The last easy contest for the Speaker, Banat was going to give him a large enough momentum to win the grand prize and his only road to the nomination – Western Moldavia or at least so he believed. With 0 electoral points to his name and three crushing defeats, Vice President Marghiloman decided it was time to step up the game as Moldavian and even Wallachian local organizations seemed to lose faith in his ability to win the nomination, with some of them even going as far as aligning with Popovici. A defeat in Banat, followed by a narrow win in Oltenia was unacceptable for the Marghiloman campaign and it would surely spell the loss of Western Moldavia. Republicans were the silver bullet that Marghiloman decided to use – just prior to the Banat contest, the Vice President secured an alliance with the Republicans.
Alexandru Mocioni would run as Marghiloman’s running mate if the latter won the Conservative nomination. Republican support or endorsement of a Popovici nomination was also out of the question, as Republicans had always been highly critical of the Nationalist faction and it was their participation in the Maiorescu Government that prevented a Republican-Conservative coalition during the President’s second term. The announced coalition radically changed the rules of the game, and not only in regards to the race for the Conservative nomination. Liberals were now more alerted than ever to the prospects of a third Conservative term at the Hill and went on to covertly support Popovici themselves, hoping the Republicans would return as wayward sons back to the PNL as soon as the Vice President was defeated in the Conservative primary. Ionel Brătianu was also a collateral victim of the Conservative-Republican deal. Trying to take control of the PNL once more, Brătianu’s main advantage over the Popescu-Coandă-Robescu faction was that unlike the latter, he was still capable of bringing the Republicans in a PNL coalition. Now that this advantage had disappeared over night, Brătianu saw his chances threatened.
Thus, by bringing the Republicans into the Conservative fold, Vice President Marghiloman managed to turn the tides – local organizations of the party were now confident that a Marghiloman nomination could carry the election with ease, given how fragmented the liberals were themselves, while Popovici’s campaign struggled to maintain its momentum. The win in Banat, he hoped, would keep his engines going into Oltenia where he expected Marghiloman to win, but it had to be as narrow as humanly possible, in order to ensure that Western Moldavia was winnable. A win there would give him exactly 236 electoral points and the nomination. But this plan was turned on its head on 12 September, when the Vice President managed a surprise win in Banat with 51% of the vote. A win was still possible for Speaker Popovici, but it was now becoming increasingly harder to surmount both the loss of steam and the essential 24 electoral votes a victory would have provided.
A win in Oltenia was now crucial for Popovici as there was little hope of winning Eastern Moldavia and Timoc and Dobrogea, both trending towards the Nationalists, could not provide enough electoral votes for him to pass the threshold. Now, the strategy had to be different – the Speaker went on to attack the Republicans and campaign on the idea that a future Marghiloman Administration would be much too tainted by the interests of the very socially progressive Republicans to be actually able to govern on a Conservative platform. The Vice President’s ability to win an election was also attacked, with Popovici claiming that while Liberals had been, up until now, the weaker major party, having to ally with Republicans and Socialists to win election, the Conservatives were always capable of winning elections by themselves, which went to show just how weak the Marghiloman candidacy was that he had to rely on “men who call themselves socially progressive” in order to win the nomination of the Conservative Party, let alone the presidency. Marghiloman’s response remained etched in the history of the party and into the party platform itself afterwards – “This party is not reactionary, Mr. Popovici!”, clearly making the case that the Conservative Party was heading to wards its own ideological reform, following those of Coronescu’s PS and the growing social-liberal wing of the PNL.
The end of the September contests shattered any hope the Popovici campaign was still clinging to. Marghiloman won Oltenia by 55%. With a margin high enough to prove that the favourite had shifted, Popovici lost the confidence he had so carefully built in Moldavia. Nevertheless, by winning Timoc, something of a consolation prize, and due to still being ahead in the electoral point count (107-74), the Speaker remained in the competition, hoping until the very end for a miracle that would bounce his campaign back. A miracle that would never come – Vice President Marghiloman handily won the rest of the contests. A defeated Popovici later endorsed Marghiloman, maintaining that the party had to be united for the election, but privately hoping that he could keep his seat at the leadership of the Assembly after 1908. Other Popovici-aligned Nationalists were not as happy with the outcome of the primary and refused to back the Conservative nominee, some even threatening with breaking off and forming a new party.
“Naționaliștii latră tare, dar fiți fără de grijă, nu mușcă!”*
Vice President Alexandru Marghiloman (December 1907)
Outcome of the Conservative Party presidential primary (1907)
Vice President Alexandru Marghiloman - 363 electoral points
Speaker Aurel Popovici - 107 electoral points
Marghiloman shrugged off the threats, implying that the Nationalists could not survive politically outside the Conservative Party and also that their outward viciousness in terms of anti-Semitism and bellicosity in foreign policy were simply buzzwords. The Marghiloman nomination did upset the balance of power, surprisingly, in the opposing party. Brătianu now had few ideas on how to conduct his battle for the leadership of the party and potentially the Liberal nomination, now coveted by both Robescu and Coandă. It wasn’t long before he realized that, internally, he had to make Robescu and Coandă split their faction by playing them off one against the other, while outwardly it was necessary to secure the support of a very valuable potential ally, much more valuable than the Republicans ever were and one that could offset their loss and bring even more – Coronescu and his socialists.
*"The Nationalists bark loudly but fear not, they don't bite!"
* Disputed, sources also count his reign from 1902, when the final hostilities of the Abyssinian Civil War ended