CHAPTER LXXII
The bloody war the Europeans were waging against each other had been relegated to the second place in the top for the most stress-inducing event for those in the upper echelons in the politics of Abyssinia in 1914. Princess Zawditu, one of the most important power players for the majority of the year that had just passed, was now wary of her chances of securing her succession to the Abyssinian throne. Menelik II, her father, was barely alive one year after the stroke that “killed” his mind in March 1913, and his situation had been deteriorating rapidly for the past few weeks. Through their violent overthrowing of the petty sultans of the Horn, the Romanians had shown Zawditu that they could not be trusted to maintain Abyssinia’s hard-fought autonomy. Instead, they had been greedily waiting for her father’s imminent death in order to hit the final blow to the country’s disintegrating political structure. The Romanian colonial government had been doing this for a long time, ever since they’d set foot in the region.
The erosion of the local governments had begun the moment the first “political advisors” from Bucharest set foot in the midst of the monarchs of the Horn. In Abyssinia, the local state was still barely functional, with the Romanian governor having progressively shaved most of its layers of authority. In the Sultanates, the process was completed by the Romanian Army. It was not long until they did so in Abyssinia as well, thought Zawditu.
What was the most frustrating for Zawditu and the few “independentists” that remained in the political circles of Abyssinia, men that wanted the country to break free of the European yoke, was that the Romanians had managed to turn the general populace against them. No longer could things return to the old ways, when the warlords reigned absolute – the economy of the Horn, deeply interwoven with Romania’s, was stronger than ever and was producing results that benefitted the locals as well. Roads were being built, entire cities were raised from nothing, while the levels of education also rose sharply in twenty years of Romanian rule.
With Romania adopting a philosophy of colonization that emphasized the development of the colonized regions in order to better benefit the metropole, meant that the reality of other European colonies in Africa – the pure and unabated exploitation of the regions and local people – was not the case for Romanian East Africa. This was mostly because of the origins of the Republic’s itself, but also due to a propensity of the Romanian political elite to emulate the Roman Empire and its way of dealing with colonies.
Zawditu’s political problem was not only that those left who supported the independence of the country were few, but that among them, there were almost none interested in propping her up as her father’s successor. Her scheming did not do her any favours either. Alexandru Mocioni, the president-turned-governor, was to meet her in order to discuss formalities following the inevitable death of her father. Everyone was acutely aware of the fact that Mocioni had little interest in maintaining the current power structure and that the formal Abyssinian state would end as soon as Menelik drew his last breath.
Princess Zawditu did try to make her case to the governor, however. She was only given a spoken guarantee that the few political allies she had, along with her, would have a “role” in the administration of REA, possibly one that was advisory and non-executive. The Monarchy of Abyssinia, along with any political structure that pertained to it was officially abolished on 12 February 1914, one week after Menelik had passed away.
The Romanians allowed the local aristocracy to “convene” and name a successor from among Menelik’s heirs, a rather obvious sham orchestrated by pro-Romanian nobles and the colonial government in order to make the takeover smoother and avoid any loose ends. The Governor of Romanian East Africa was now the ruler of the entire Horn. The only check on his power was the President of Romania, to whom he answered directly.
While not much changed in terms of everyday life in Abyssinia or Eritrea, In the former sultanates, the situation was still rather volatile after the takeover. The Romanian Army had almost completely wiped out the Dervish movement, either killing its leaders or forcing them into submission, but the local population was still deeply divided in regards to their loyalties. The Orthodox Somali, which now stood at around 5-6% of the population, loyal to the Romanian Colonial Government, were used by Governor Mocioni to try and bring the neutral part of the population into the Romanian fold. This proved difficult as a large segment of the Somalis were devout Muslims and were heavily influenced by the Dervish Movement.
But both the Romanian Church and the colonial government persevered in their attempts. As a show of loyalty to the colonial government, Somalis were drafted and incorporated into the colonial armies preparing to face off against the French in Djibouti, while others submitted themselves to the Romanian Church and converted to Christian Orthodoxy.
Mocioni had an answer for those that remained defiant as well, they were forced out of their homes by the Army and replaced in their towns, villages and homes by those that accepted Romanian overlordship. But the discretionary methods of Mocioni did not remain obscured to those in Bucharest. The Socialists and President Brătianu became the prime opponents to Mocioni’s almost dictatorial rule in the Horn, albeit for different reasons.
The Socialists and Coronescu, appalled at the methods of the former president, were looking for ways to curtail the institutional powers of the Governor of Romanian East Africa by making him answerable to Parliament as well as the President of Romania. President Brătianu, on the other hand, wanted to rid himself of a powerful political rival and also find a way to finish the Republicans off and turn them back to the PNL.
The Ionel Brătianu Administration was still rather rough at the edges and not completely unified. This was mainly because the president himself was not one of the strongest incumbents to date, being the formal leader of a large and not very cohesive coalition and also the member of a party that had lost much of its political influence in almost all areas of government. The PNL, on a clear downwards trend since 1900, had given way to both Socialists and Conservatives on both sides of the political spectrum and managed to claim the presidency only because of the very special situation the country found itself in and due to Brătianu’s own personal charisma and capacity to scheme. Now that he was president, however, he realized that his mission was more difficult than ever.
The most difficult to handle for Brătianu at the current juncture were the Conservatives, most of whom deeply opposed the idea of simply letting the Liberals handle the executive in a time when they were at their strongest in terms of electoral prowess. Vice President Mihail Stroescu was one of those that wanted to make sure that the National Union Coalition was reshuffled in 1916 with a conservative president and a conservative-dominated cabinet. On the other hand, the Socialists wanted to curtail excesses from both Liberals and Conservatives and also keep their winning edge for 1916. More frequently, they found themselves in the middle of Conservative-Liberal squabble. This time was different – the Socialists asked for Mocioni’s resignation or for Brătianu to fire him and for guarantees that the rights of the people of REA be held to the same standards as those of people in Romania proper.
Despite the fact that the war was taking up almost all of his energy and resources, President Brătianu realized he had to take full control of his administration before it was destroyed from inside. The most urgent situation was that of the Conservatives, as both the vice president and the Conservative ministers had to be brought to heel. Or at least this was his initial plan. The events
Ionel Brătianu Administration
President: Ion I. C. Brătianu (Liberal)
Vice President: Mihail Stroescu (Conservative)
Minister of Internal Affairs: Take Ionescu (Conservative)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Victor Berger (Socialist)
Minister of War: Ioan Argetoianu (Conservative)
Minister of Finances: Alecu Constantinescu (Liberal)
Minister of Justice: Mihail Oromolu (Conservative)
Minister of Labour: Eugen Rozvan (Socialist)
Minister of Agriculture: Ion Borcea (Conservative)
Minister of Infrastructure and Public Works: Ion Nistor (Liberal)
Minister of the Colonies: Emanoil Porumbaru (Liberal)
Minister of Public Health: Nicolae L. Lupu (Socialist)
Minister of Education and Research: Anton Bibescu (Conservative)
Minister of Culture: Ștefan Pop (Republican)
that followed 1912 showed him that that was impossible. At first, Vice President Stroescu tried his hand at convincing Brătianu of running a co-presidency, as part of the larger deal that was made when the National Union Government was created. But President Brătianu had not come this far just to share his power. Instead, he thoroughly tried to marginalize Stroescu by forcing him to do trivial activities on his behalf. Stroescu was sent into the territory to discuss issues between prefects and the local authorities or behind Romanian lines, into border areas to discuss war-related issues with generals and report back in Bucharest.
Obviously, all of this information was already delivered to the president via the usual channels, and both Stroescu and the people he was sent to knew that Brătianu was just wasting his vice president’s time. It was all of this that made Stroescu realize how powerless his position truly was, especially as part of non-partisan administration. And it left him determined to replace Brătianu from his position… with himself. And he was not alone in this endeavour, around him were the great magnates and capitalists that supported the Conservative Party.
President Ionel Brătianu (middle) with members of the War Council established at the Ministries of External Affairs and of War
A campaign against Brătianu was begun in Craiova and other parts of south-western Romania supported by Jean Mihail, one of the major conservative donors. Mihail, known as the Lion of Oltenia (Leul Olteniei), was one of the wealthiest men in Romania and a major landowner. Mihail’s war with the president involved the local press as well as large Bucharester publications looking to profit from the landowner’s generous handouts.
Not only Conservative publications were involved, but even newspapers that were generally considered to be neutral such as the investigative “Santinela” started attacking Brătianu on behalf of the Conservatives and Mihail. Titles such as “Can the President withstand the Lion?” were meant to discredit President Brătianu as an effective war-leader and mock his leadership in the eyes of the army. This was, of course, unacceptable for the president who realized that Stroescu was no longer looking to simply enhance his influence within government and the administration. He was out to replace him as leader of the Great Coalition and as President of Romania.
The Conservatives in his administration were all sold on the plan for all he knew, so if he wanted to orchestrate Stroescu’s downfall, he also had to rid himself of them. The Conservative Party itself would have to become nothing more than an annex to his will and the new vice president would have to be a loyal man with few ambitions.
As the president’s war with the Conservatives and their large economic empire sharpened, Conservative deputy and major landowner Petru Groza also joined in the fight. The president retaliated by blocking their respective local council’s funding, a risky move considering those counties were Liberal-Conservative battlegrounds and were crucial to the PNL’s ability to return as a major national party in 1916. But this was now a fight to the death to save his presidency, Brătianu believed, no measure was too risky.
At the same time, Liberal-aligned newspapers were also fired up to attack Conservatives and the councils controlled by them as ineffective, in order to blame the lack of funds on them and not the central government. Liberal prefects in the counties were also ordered to block any attempts by Conservative mayors or county council leaders to effectively administer their constituencies. A fight that Mihail, Groza and Stroescu believed to be asymmetrical in their favour, turned out to be an opportunity for the president to display the true power behind the presidency of Romania.
Even with a non-partisan administration and shared power, the president was still an extremely powerful figure, and the population in Mihail and Groza’s counties, grew tired and irked by the politicians fighting, in the midst of an on-going war no less, by using their resources and their livelihoods. Not only that, territory Conservatives were also greatly affected by their party’s conflict with the president.
Not only were they getting lambasted by their own constituents for not doing their jobs, but they were also looking at potential challengers from the Socialists in the next election. The latter stood on the sidelines patiently, waiting to pick apart what was left of the Conservatives and Liberals. In the Boyar Stronghold, for instance, Socialists were, in 1912, on a close third place from the Liberals and not that far away from the Conservatives either.
President Brătianu knew that there was little he could do to ensure a Liberal win in the area and that it was all left to either luck or breaking the Conservatives enough to ensure the Socialists winning there. The Socialists were no friends of his, but if the Conservatives wanted to play the self-destruct game, he would gladly humour them.
The PC organizations in the territory that were most affected by this conflict did not share their leaders’ interests in a bloodfight, however. Instead, they turned to other leaders of the party for support. Among them was Take Ionescu, still minister of the Interior and still as ambitious as ever. Instead of distancing himself from the administration, as was the order in the PC, Ionescu aligned himself with Brătianu hoping to prop himself up on the national political stage. Ionescu had made it clear to the president that party affiliation would not stop him from achieving his goals and that the Conservative Party was not his master, but simply a vehicle.
This undying ambition was something that President Brătianu could appreciate, but it was not something that he wanted in someone like Ionescu. What he needed from his minister was loyalty, and it seemed like Ionescu was willing to give his in full for the time being. From 1913 to 1915, Brătianu used the full might of the Romanian executive to force the Conservatives into his submission – by marginalizing unruly ministers that were still loyal to Stroescu, to using his emergency powers as a war-time leader to suppress Mihail’s and Groza’s attempts at attacking him using the press.
Newspapers were closed, agitators were rounded up and unruly local politicians were defunded. Instead, those supporting Ionescu and his allies went on to be rewarded. By 1915, Take Ionescu had created a critical movement that was following him and President Brătianu, one that was ready to take down the old leadership, still herded around by former President Maiorescu. 75 years old now, the elder president was still calling many shots within the organization, as Stroescu sometimes faltered in his conviction to continue the fight.
Nevertheless, he was getting old and realized that there was little he could do to stop the wave that was coming – Ionescu was indeed going to become the leader of the party after he single-handedly brought together a coalition of nationalists, junimists as well as those from the new generation of conservatives. Ionescu’s new faction, nicknamed “the bannermen”, both for their allegiance to Brătianu and for their upholding of the initial accord of the National Union Coalition, itself nicknamed the “Red-Yellow-and-Blue Alliance”, after the Romanian flag and the combined flags of the parties.
In the north, critical Ionescu-Brătianu ally Iancu Flondor secured the local Conservative Party organizations, dealing a hard blow to the Stroescu faction. Flondor, a former Maiorescu-ally and protege, abhorred Stroescu’s approach to politics, especially at a time when the country found itself at war and could not afford costly political conflicts. Iuliu Maniu, another younger politician, previously in President Marghiloman’s group, went on to join Take Ionescu in his quest against the former PC establishment. With the Transylvanian PC brought by Maniu firmly in their camp, Ionescu and Brătianu went on to give a final blow to the Stroescu-Junimea faction.
Caricature depicting President Brătianu's victory over the Conservative Party establishment. The caption reads "Maiorescu's departure. Dear Titu, don't forget: Compliments to Tăkiță (diminutive of Take)"
Party organizations convened a Conservative National Convention in May 1915, exactly one year before the next presidential inauguration. The CNC, now dominated by Ionescu and his allies, voted for a reshuffle of the Conservative effort in the National Union Government. This was meant to buy more time for Ionescu to secure the southern party organizations, most of which were still kept by Jean Mihail in a tight grasp.
But even those local Conservative politicians were starting to change their tune. No amount of money that could be sent by Mihail could rival the actual defunding from the central Romanian Government that their counties had went through. With their constituents having lost faith in them, the only way to not be destroyed in the election was to submit to Ionescu’s carefully designed plan – a proposal to run in tangent with the Liberals.
President Brătianu agreed to not run PNL candidates in areas where the PC candidate had the upper hand or where the Socialists were threatening to shave support from either party. It was the perfect deal for the local politicians heavy hit by the conflict between the PC leadership and the president and they did not wait much to accept. The CNC formally withdrew Vice President Stroescu’s nomination for 1916, thus also removing him from the leadership position in the party. Take Ionescu was nominated for Vice President of Romania for 1916 and the party stood unified once more.